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ABSTRACT
In 1980, the railroad industry was deregulated due to poor industry
performance as well as an ideological shift. The newly developed contestable
market theory provided the political justification for deregulating what was
previously perceived as a natural monopoly. The theme of this study is the
examination of whether contestable market conditions exist in the U.S. surface
transportation industry which are sufficient to justify giving up direct
governmental involvement in the railroad industry. The main generic market
structures that play an important role in the regulatory discussion are introduced
and implications for regulatory intervention in the case of railroads are drawn.
The market structures examined are the perfect competition model, the natural
monopoly, the contestable market theory and the cartel. Next, the history of
railroad regulation and the changing position of railroads in the surface market is
described. This history ranges from beginning of regulation in 1887 up to its
abolishment in 1980. The outcomes of railroad deregulation regarding market
concentration and operations are analyzed and key factors of railroad profitability
are determined. Some consideration is given to the regulatory environment of
other surface transportation modes, mainly the trucking industry, because the
intermodal market is the relevant market for contestability. The intermodal
transportation market which has grown rapidly since deregulation is described
and analyzed. The present railroad market is segmented. The segments are

examined for their degree of contestability. Particular markets are introduced.
E.g., the market extremes of transportation of wheat out of the Northern Plains
and intermodal container traffic in the Ohio River Valley are examined for “fit” of
the Contestable Market Theory. Open-access as a suitable alternative form of
railroad regulation is discussed.

This study finds that no railroad market segment is contestable and hence
that railroad deregulation based on contestable markets is not justified.
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Preface
Masters Theses at the College of Business Administration are few and far
between; and they are usually encumbered with an air of mystique. A variety
of people are involved, and all of these see the thesis in the context of their
own goals: as a scientific investigation of a phenomenon, as a tool to teach
certain skills, as an unavoidable must, as a vehicle of self-promotion, or as a
gift of or to a university.
The time has now come to make a few brief remarks on the context in which
this work has been conceived: Professor Donald N. Baum, as Chairman of
the UNO CBA Graduate Program Council, and Professor Sufi Nazem and
Professor Louis Pol, from the Department of Marketing, have affixed their
signatures to this document. But the most significant impact on this piece of
work can be attributed to Professor Michael J. O’Hara: my mentor, advisor
and friend for our joint excursions into his favorite playground. Without his
commitment and patience, bringing my endeavors to a successful conclusion
would not have been possible.
But, nominally, the writing of a thesis constitutes only a fraction of the
requirements for the acquisition of an MBA degree. I now believe that the real
challenge of obtaining an MBA degree lies not simply in dealing with subject
matters on an academic level or showing proficiency in particular fields;
rather, the real task lies in mastering the administrative challenges involved.
By far, the greatest credit in this field goes to my advisor Alexandra M.
Kaczmarek. Without her inventiveness, diligence and inspiration, my
graduation would simply not have been feasible.
The time is not ripe yet to judge on any long-term value of an UNO MBA
degree. Particularly, whether it can provide some competitive advantage for
managing business in America, in Europe, or in Asia. The following years
may bring about certainty.

Johannes Koeppe
December 16th, 1997
Shanghai, P.R. China
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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION
Railroads were heavily regulated from the late 19th century until the late
20th century. During the era of regulation the transportation industry undergone
significant changes. The emergence of the trucking industry introduced a mode
able to complement and to some extent substitute for railroad service. The
railroads were unable to respond to the new developments appropriately and
were plunged into financial crisis.

During the 1970s, leading economists accused the prevalent regulatory
system of hindering railroads from adapting their business properly to the new
market environment. Deregulation was assumed to be a remedy to restore the
financial health of railroads and to reduce government’s role in markets. In the
late 1970s, the transportation market was totally different from what it had been
80 years prior. Economists argued that the conditions that had ultimately led to
regulation 80 years ago were no longer existent. More specifically, the
availability of alternative modes of transportation was said to make most of the
entire transportation market competitive.

2

In the 1980 year Staggers Act, Congress explicitly recognized that "today,
most transportation within the United States is competitive."1 Two assumptions
set forth by economists provided justification for deregulation. First, regulation
was assumed to hinder railroads in responding to their new market environment.
Secondly, it was believed that a deregulated railroad industry would permit a
competitive surface transportation industry even though railroads were natural
monopolies.

The term "Contestable Market" was coined by Baumol in the late 1970s.
At the same time, regulation of a number of industries was abolished along with
a transition to a more lax antitrust enforcement policy. The gist of the railroad
argument is that the surface transportation industry would exhibit characteristics
of a "contestable market", a market form that allows competitive conditions in a
monopolistic market environment.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the outcomes of deregulation of
the railroad industry with respect to its goals and predicted outcomes. Special
emphasis is given to the concept “contestability" as a justification for allowing
monopolistic market structures. “Contestable markets” are examined to find the
extent to which the deregulated railroad industry satisfies the criteria of a

1 Congressional Declaration of Findings set forth as an Historical Note to 49 U.S.C. 10101(a).
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contestable market. Also, alternative regulatory means are examined for
suitability to increase competition in the deregulated railroad industry.

In Chapter II, the main generic market structures that play an important
role in the regulatory discussion are introduced and implications for regulatory
intervention in the case of railroads are drawn. These market structures are the
perfect competition model, the natural monopoly, the contestable market theory,
and the cartel. Issues like universal service to isolated shippers, price
discrimination against shippers, internal cross-subsidizing, sunk-costs, and
predatory pricing are analyzed in general.

In Chapter III, the history of railroad regulation and the changing position
of railroads in the surface transportation market are described from the beginning
of regulation in 1887 up to its abolishment in 1980.

Chapter IV begins with a brief overview of railroad specific terms. Next,
the outcomes of railroad deregulation regarding market concentration and
operations are analyzed and key factors of railroad profitability are determined.
The chapter concludes with an overview of the trucking industry and the main
provisions of the deregulation of the trucking industry, since trucking is often a
close substitute for rail.

4

In the first section of Chapter V, the intermodal transportation market,
which has grown rapidly since deregulation, is described and analyzed. In
section two, the present railroad market is segmented and the segments are
examined for their degree of contestability and particular markets are introduced.
Chapter V concludes with a discussion whether open-access as a suitable
alternative form of railroad regulation. The findings of this study are presented in
Chapter VI.

5

CHAPTER II.
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

A.

Perfect Competition

A perfectly competitive market satisfies the following criteria:2

1. Large number of small buyers and sellers,
2. All firms maximize profit,
3. Free and costless entry and exit,
4. Potential entrants face the same market demands as those available to
incumbent firms. Products are homogenous, consequently there is no brand
loyalty,
5. Potential entrants face the same productive techniques as those available to
incumbent firms,
6. Equal access to input markets, especially equal access to factor prices, and
7. Perfect information.

If all of the features for perfect competition are present except the last
one, then the market is described as purely competitive rather than perfectly
competitive.3

2 Tisdell, 1982, p. 182. See also Dewy, 1975, p. 127. See also Shows, 1972, p. 279.
3 Shows, 1972, p. 281.

6

In the following discussion the criteria for perfect competition are
discussed briefly and some implications of the model will be highlighted.

The distinguishing feature of the perfect competition model is that the
market consists of a large number of small (“atomistic”) buyers and sellers. Each
firm is so small that no one can, acting alone, influence market price by varying
output quantity, and no group of firms can form to act in concert to influence
market price.

The production technique characteristic to the industry causes each firm’s
average total costs to increase as output increases after passing through a
minimum cost (see Figure 1 on page 7). Given the individual firm’s cost
characteristics and assuming total industry demand exceeds individual firms’
efficient scale of production (Q’ » q’), it is more efficient to allocate total industry
production among a large number of firms with each firm producing at the
minimum of average total costs.

7
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Figure 1: The Demand And Supply Schedule For The Industry And The Individual Firm Under
Perfect Competition.

Because no firm can influence market price by varying its output quantity,
the individual firm faces a horizontal demand curve equal to the competitive
industry’s equilibrium price. This implies that the market price P’ does not
change over the firm’s entire output range. All firms are considered to be pricetakers, maximizing their profit by selecting the quantity of output at which
marginal revenue (mr) is equal to marginal cost (me). A horizontal demand curve
yields marginal revenue equal to demand. Applying the profit maximization rule
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of (me = mr), and noting that mr = d = P’ means that the market yields a “price
taker” which will produce where P’ = me.

Raising its price above the competitive level on the part of a single firm
would simultaneously cause two effects. First, since the firm faces a horizontal
demand curve, it would immediately lose all its customers. Second, attracted by
excess economic profit, any entrepreneur would immediately enter the market
and serve the former firm’s demand. Correspondingly, a price below the market
equilibrium price (which is equal to average total costs) would cause an
economic loss and make the firm leave the market in the long run. Equilibrium is
reached when no firm desires to enter or leave the market. Hence, the condition
for the equilibrium to be sustainable is that price equals each firm’s minimum
average total costs in the long run.4 At this point each firm i in the industry
produces an output of qV Summing up the individual firms’ output yields total
industry supply

/

where n equals the number of firms in the industry. In sum, for the
equilibrium under perfect competition the following conditions are effective:

4 tn the short run, the firm stays in the industry as long as the price is equal or above variable
cost. To achieve allocative efficiency, the price taker firm produces only and always the output
where price equals marginal cost.
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P’ = me = ate = mr = d.
That is, in the long run each firm earns zero economic profit but it can
recover its full costs.5

1.

Normative Implications of the Perfect Competition Model

The following implications can be inferred from the foregoing explanation:

1. In a perfect competitive industry each firm earns zero economic profit since
market price equals each firm’s average total costs (P1= ate) in the long run.
On the other hand, each firm can recover its full costs in the long run.
Therefore, under perfect competition neither firms nor consumers are favored
at the other’s expense.

2. Under perfect competition, production in each individual firm and hence in the
industry occurs where average total costs of production are minimal (see
Figure 1 on page 7). Therefore, under perfect competition the industry

5 Economic profit also is defined as “rent”. It must be pointed out that economic profit does not
equal profit in an accounting sense (accounting profit). Both accountants and economists
calculate profit by subtracting costs from total revenue. However, costs are calculated differently.
While accountants calculate costs solely on the basis of physical assets, depreciation and book
value, economists add opportunity cost of the firm’s resources as an implicit cost. Therefore, at
zero economic profit the firm earns an economist’s normal profit (which may require a profit in an
accounting sense) sufficient to stay in the industry in the long run.
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archives the definition of production efficiency.

3. Under perfect competition, production in each individual firm and hence in the
industry occurs where price equals marginal cost of production. Some
economists contend that marginal cost, besides measuring variations in actual
production costs from the firm’s perspective, also measures opportunity costs
of production from the point of view of society (social costs).6 Following that
reasoning, an industry achieves allocative efficiency under perfect competition
because market price equals society’s opportunity costs of production.

Because under perfect competition price would equal both private
marginal cost and private average total costs, and private marginal cost would
equal social marginal cost, economists often set perfect competition equal to
Pareto Optimality if no externalities are present.7 A Pareto Optimum is the locus
in a set of individual utility functions at which it is not possible to make somebody
better off without making somebody else worse off. Therefore, under Pareto
Optimality social welfare is said to be maximized. Both the definition of Pareto
Optimality as an indicator for maximum social welfare and the identification of

6 Tisdell, 1982, p. 218-219. According to Tisdell, an industry’s marginal costs are equal to the
costs society would incur if it would allocate that industry’s resources elsewhere in the most
efficient way.
7 Dewey, 1975, p. 229.
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Pareto Optimality with perfect competition have not been accepted
unanimously.8

Nevertheless, it can be established with certainty that in a perfect
competitive industry neither firms nor consumers are favored at the other’s
expense because market price equals each firm’s average total costs. Hence, in
a sense of equal welfare distribution, perfect competition is the preferable market
form.

2.

Limitations of the Perfect Competition Model: The Decreasing
Cost Case

The model of perfect competition is based on the assumption that it is
more efficient to allocate total industry production among a large number of
equally sized firms. Fragmentation of the industry, in turn, makes each individual
firm face a horizontal demand curve set at the industry’s equilibrium price. From
the perspective of the individual firm, expansion is constrained in the face of
increasing costs as output increases.

In contrast, Figure 2 on page 12 depicts the hypothetical case of a firm
facing a horizontal demand curve but decreasing cost curves over the industry’s
“entire range of output” such that firms cannot profit maximize at mr = me since

8 For detailed explanation, see Dewey, 1975, chapters 13 and 14.
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at no output does mr = me. Instead, at any output above the cost covering
output the firm’s profit continues to grow until the firm is the size of the industry.

Firm
$

d = mr
P'
ate
me

0

Q

Figure 2: The Firm Under “Perfect Competition” In A Decreasing Costs Industry.9

Recalling that product price is assumed to be fixed and all firms maximize
profit, a perfectly competitive firm would expand to the end of the industry’s
demand. The reason is that its marginal cost curve fails further and further
below marginal revenue as its production increases, and so marginal profitability
of expansion raises.10 In this case an equilibrium with a number of firms in the
industry is not sustainable. This proves to be a contradiction to the basic

9 The course of the marginal cost function (MC) intentionally is not exactly specified because it is
not crucial for the implications of the phenomenon depicted. However, it is certain that MC is
below ATC over the entire range of output.
Proof: T C = F C + V C * Q and FC » V C (fixed costs are relatively high -» in comparison
variable costs are small and hence nearly constant over the entire range of output).
FC'

f'C'

-► MC = il£ - = v c (1); ATC = — +VC (2); lim ATC = VC (3).
> 0 -►
3Q
Q
e-*«
Q
ATC > MC where Q < oo.
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assumption of the perfect competition model saying that there is a large number
of small firms in the industry. Decreasing costs over a large scale of output
constitute a phenomenon called “economics of scale”.11 The normative
implication of this phenomenon is that in decreasing-cost industries perfect
competition is not feasible. Rather, the industry is a natural monopoly.

B.

The Natural Monopoly
An industry is said to be a natural monopoly if, over the entire relevant

range of outputs, the firm’s cost function is strictly subadditive.12 In the single
product case, subadditivity means that a firm can produce an output q to supply
the entire market at a lower unit cost than k firms,

c(?)<ic(i,).
/• = i

In the multiproduct case subadditivity is defined in the same way, meaning
that a single firm can produce a set of outputs at a lower unit cost than two or
more firms,

10 Tisdell, 1982, p. 221.
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co>+yj<coo + coo.

For the single product case, economics o f size are sufficient for
subadditivity. Railroads have been a typical example for a natural monopoly
(i.e., investment in infrastructure and rolling stock requires high expenses which
constitute high fixed operating cost whereas variable operating costs are
comparatively low).

In the multiproduct case, size economics are not sufficient for
subadditivity.13 In a multiple output market, subadditivity holds only if there are
economics o f jo in t production.'4 Tests of economics of joint production are cost
complementarity or trans-ray convexity of the cost function, which are both
sufficient for subadditivity by themselves.15

1.

Normative Implications of the Natural Monopoly

11 Large scale of production (“economics of scale”) is one of other causes of cost advantages due
to large size of the firm. Therefore, in the following the term “economics of size” is used instead of
“economics of scale”.
12 Sharky, 1982, Chapter 4.
13 Sharky, 1982, p. 62.
14 Also denoted “economics of scope”.
15 Cost complementarity holds if an increase in the quantity of one output reduces the incremental
cost of producing other outputs. A two-product cost function C is trans-ray convex at a quantity of
output y, if there is a line through y with a negative slope such that C is convex along the segment
of hat line bounded by the output coordinate axes.

15

First, it must be that in the presence of size economics, society appears to
be better off when the entire market is served by one single firm. This is the
ideal way for society to achieve allocative and production efficiency to maximize
social welfare.
On the other hand, a market served by one firm lacks the “invisible hand”
mechanisms that lead to allocative and production efficiency. Under perfect
competition no firm can, acting alone, influence market price. If a firm raises its
price it will be rejected by the market. However, if the entire market is served by
one monopolist, the monopolist possesses market power. That is, the
monopolist can influence the market price by varying its output quantity.
Because of this a monopolist is also classified as a price-searcher, instead of a
price-taker.

16
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Figure 3: The Natural Monopoly.16

Like any firm, the monopolist produces a quantity where MR = MC (at
point H) in order to maximize his profit. In Figure 3 on page 16 this yields an
output quantity of Q1 and a price of p1.

Different from a firm under perfect competition (Figure 1 on page 16), a
natural monopoly does not face increasing average total costs beyond some
quantity of output. Therefore, ATC and MC do not intersect at any point (which
would be the firm’s point of production under perfect competition). In the case of
a natural monopoly, marginal cost pricing (as the case under perfect competition)

16 For the marginal cost curve, see Footnote 9 on page 12.
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would yield a point of production at point J, output would be Q2, market price
would be p2, and consumer surplus were p2JEp2. However, it can be seen that
at point J the monopolist would suffer a loss since at Q2 the ATC > p2. This loss
is equal to p2JGp3p2. The monopolist would have no incentive to produce in the
long run unless he would be allowed to engage in price discrimination against
consumers.17

The monopolist restraints output to Q1 so that he earns a rent equal to
BCAplB, and consumers suffer a loss equal to p3FAp1p3 which exceeds the
monopolist’s rent by far. Consumers retain the surplus p1 AEp1. Society suffers
a net loss (so called Kaldor-Hicks loss18) equal to p3FACBp3.

Producing at the cost covering point F would yield a market price p3 and
an output quantity of Q3, which is less than the output Q2 under marginal cost
pricing but much higher than the output Q1 at the monopolist’s profit maximizing
point. At point F, the monopolist would earn an accounting profit but no
economic profit; At the cost covering point F the monopolist would earn an
accounting profit but no economic profit; while consumers would suffer a loss
compared to marginal cost pricing equal to p2JFp3p2. Since p2JFp3p2 <

17 In the short run a firm may produce where p < ATC as long as p > AFC. If fixed costs are sunk
costs (which is the case for a main share of fixed cost in the railroad industry), in the short run a
firm may even produce where p < AFC. This constitutes the basis for predatory pricing.
18 Tisdell, 1982, p. 214.

18

p2JGp3p2 (the monopolist’s loss under marginal cost production), the optimal
point of production would be point F since society’s loss is minimal at this point.

The following statements can be inferred from the above observation:

■ The distinguishing feature of the natural monopoly is relatively high fixed cost
that need to be recovered. Therefore, it is socially desirable that the entire
market is served by only one firm to capitalize on size economics.
■ The monopolist will, if unregulated, exert market power, select the output
where MR = MC and earn a rent at the expense of consumer and social
welfare.
■ Marginal cost pricing is not feasible under natural monopoly since no
production would occur.
■ The socially optimal point of production under a natural monopoly occurs
where P = ATC. Therefore, regulatory policy should set a price ceiling at
average total costs.

In the case of the railroads a striking issue is the issue of universal
service™ That is, it is socially desirable that even remote rural areas are served
by the railroads. However, assuming there was only one railroad serving the
market, it would be inclined to reduce its output quantity, raise its prices and earn
a rent. The railroad would operate only main tracks with high traffic density
where it can predictably recover its fixed cost. Low density tracks in remote
areas would tend to be abandoned. Figure 3 on page 16 provides the theoretical

19 Knieps, 1988, p. 21.

19

proof for that behavior. It shows that in the absence of regulation, a monopolist
would reduce his output to Q1 and raise the price to p1. A monopolistic railroad
may be willing to serve low density lines at higher rates which would constitute a
case of price discrimination against remote shippers.20 A monopolist might also
employ price discrimination against markets if it serves some areas where it
faces competition and others where no competition exists. In that case, the
railroad would charge rates above average total costs in markets where it
possesses monopoly power. A monopolist may use price discriminatory
behavior called cross-subsidizing. Monopoly power in one market would allow
the railroad to charge rates below average total costs in a different market where
it faces competition, and hence to achieve a competitive advantage.

Investments in infrastructure do not only constitute high fixed cost but also
constitute sunk cost because investments in infrastructure cannot be recovered
at a future date. Sunk costs have considerable influence in the strategic conduct
of firms depending on whether the firm is an insider or a potential entrant.
Potential entrants perceive sunk costs as a barrier to entry because commitment
in sunk assets bears the risk of considerable loss. Insiders who already have

20 In terms of law, price discrimination is constituted where pA * pBfor the same commodity ascent
prior knowledge of cost differentials equal to the price differentials. In the U.S., price
discrimination is illegal under section 2 of the Clayton Act, better known as Robinson-Patman Act
(15 U.S.C. § 13). In economic terms, price discrimination is constituted where

Pa

m ca

^

Pb

m cb

(Dewey, 1975, p. 48). Hence, charging higher rates for railroad service in remote areas with lower
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incurred sunk cost perceive sunk assets as not relevant for pricing decisions
since there is no opportunity to employ those elsewhere. Hence, insiders will
stay in the industry as long as revenue covers at least variable cost. If two or
more railroads compete directly with each other, each of them might
independently fix its prices equal to variable cost in order to attract demand.
However, since revenues do not cover total costs, the firm suffers an economic
loss which prevents the firm from maintaining and replacing its assets in the long
run. If persistent, then this phenomenon is denoted destructive competition.21 If
a firm independently sets its prices below its own average total costs and below
the competitor’s variable cost in order to force a competitor out of business, this
behavior is denoted predatory pricing.22

Put together, there are three main structural reasons to regulate railroads:

1. A natural monopoly might abuse its market power (i.e., earn a rent, practice
price discrimination, refuse to contract).

Regulatory protection against a monopolist’s abuse of market power can
be attempted by regulatory establishment of a maximum rate the railroad may

traffic density constitutes a case of price discrimination in a law sense but not necessarily in an
economic sense.
21 Knieps, 1988, p. 48.
22 Shughard, 1990, p. 295. See also Footnote 17 on page 17.
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charge (rate ceiling), setting a maximum rate of return the railroad is allowed to
earn (rate of return regulation), prohibiting price discrimination and control
mergers.

2. To provide universal service (“common-carrier obligation”).

To guarantee universal service, regulatory authorities may confer a
general obligation to contract upon the railroads. This includes control of track
abandonments, that is, exit. The regulator takes over the market function of
controlling entry and exit.

3. To avoid destructive competition and predatory pricing.

Destructive competition and predatory pricing can be avoided by
establishing a minimum price railroads may charge. This price must not be lower
than average total costs. Regulation of entry and exit is another means to avoid
destructive competition and predatory pricing.
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C.

The Contestable Market Theory

The contestable market theory is a relatively new theory of industry
structure. It was finally formalized in 1982 after more than ten years of
preliminary preparations. The theory is a generalization of the model of perfect
competition insofar as it allows an oligopoly or even a monopoly instead of
atomistic competition to maximize social welfare. The theory states that, even
under a monopoly, production can occur at a socially optimal point because the
threat of potential entry can encourage the monopolist to refrain from producing
inefficiently or earning a rent.

A perfectly contestable market satisfies the following criteria:23

1. Economics of size or scope may be present, accordingly there may be an
oligopoly or even a monopoly in the market.
2. All firms maximize profit.
3. Free and costless entry and exit. Firms enter the market whenever entry is
profitable.24 Only sunk costs are regarded to be a barrier to entry and exit.25
Consequently, no sunk costs are incurred upon entry.
4. Potential entrants face the same market demands as those available to
incumbent firms. Products are homogenous, consequently there is no brand
loyalty.

23 Baumol, 1988, p. xiii; also Baumol, 1994, p. 42.
24 Baumol, 1988, p. 5.
25 Baumol, 1994, pp. 42-43.
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5. Potential entrants face the same productive techniques as those available to
incumbent firms.
6. Equal access to input markets, especially equal access to factor prices.
7. Perfect Information.

Entry becomes attractive for potential entrants whenever an incumbent
earns a rent. Potential entrants assume that the incumbent’s prices are
sustainable which means that the incumbent does not match the entrant’s price
immediately upon entry26 (this is the so-called Bertrand-Nash Conjecture27).
Therefore, entrants can expect to distract incumbent’s business. When the
incumbent matches the price, the entrant will leave the market. Exit is assumed
to be costless. Per definition, no sunk costs have been incurred so all
investments can be recovered fully. A temporary economic profit remains with
the entrant. Therefore, entrants can pursue a hit-and-run-strategy.

The central statement of the contestable market theory is that the threat of
potential entry makes the monopolist allocate resources and produce efficiently.
In other words, Pareto Optimality is achieved.28 Pareto optimality is a necessary
condition for the monopoly or oligopoly to be sustainable, and sustainability is a
necessary condition for equilibrium:29
/
26 Baumol, 1988, p. 11.
27 Knieps, 1988, p. 45.
28 Baumol, 1994, p. 44. See Baumol, 1982 p. 4.
29 Baumol, 1988, p. 11.
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“To achieve sustainability, even a natural monopolist must operate in
an efficient manner and must earn no more than a normal rate of
return on its capital investments. That is, in contestable markets a
monopoly firm can only earn zero profits and must operate
efficiently.”30

In the early 1980s, when the theory had evolved, its authors claimed that
many industries were contestable, especially long distance telephony and the
airline industry.31 Contestability had been proposed as a general guide for
regulation.32 The phrase that has often been cited is that airplanes represent
“capital on wings”33 that is perfectly mobile. By now these assumptions have
proved to be misguided. Critics of the theory point out that the assumptions the
theory is based on are highly restrictive and that the deductive results would hold
/

only when these pure conditions exist.34 Therefore contestability was far away
from reality.

The most restrictive assumption of the Contestable Market Theory is that
it regards only sunk costs as barriers to entry and exit.35 However, in reality,

30 Baumol, 1988, p.
31 Baumol, 1988, p.
32 Baumol, 1988, p.
33 Baumol, 1988, p.
34 Shepherd, 1995.
35 Baumol, 1994, p.

6.
489. See also Bailey, 1981.
466.
500.
43.
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there are many different barriers to entry and exit, such as legal barriers,
switching costs, customer loyalty, experience curves, diseconomies of size,
artificial barriers to entry erected by incumbents and so on. These barriers can
lessen or even eliminate the threat of entry even if entry involves no sunk costs.

Schwartz points out that the Bertrand-Nash Conjecture does not hold in
practice but that in practice incumbents change price rapidly in response to entry
which offsets the ease of entry and makes markets noncontestable in the sense
that pricing behavior becomes unaffected by the treat of entry.36

By 1994 Baumol came to the conclusion that “a perfect contestable
market is a fictional ideal, no more to be found in reality than a market that is
perfectly competitive. But [...] the object of using this concept is to give
regulators a model for the design of rules for markets that are distinctly not
contestable.”37

1.

Implications of the Contestable Market Theory

Despite the criticism the oontestable market theory has been confronted
with in terms of its practical applicability it renders some insights for regulation:

36 Schwartz, 1986, p. 55.
37 Baumol, 1994, p. 43.
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1. Fixed cost versus sunk costs.
A natural monopoly (size economics through high fixed cost) does not
constitute a barrier to entry per se but fixed costs must be sunk costs at the
same time.38 As long as fixed cost can be recovered potential competition is
more likely to keep the industry competitive.

2. Barriers to entry.
Since barriers to entry are the main impediment to perfect contestability,
regulatory policy should concentrate on the abolishment of barriers to entry.

3. New definition o f the relevant market
The idea of the “potential entry” opens up the view of the market. That is,
“substitutes” expand to include potential entrants that can compete with the
incumbent despite the fact that they might currently belong to a different industry.
The relevant market becomes broader. This insight has practical relevance for
the regulation of railroads. It is obvious that the railroad industry will never
satisfy the criteria for contestability, if for no other reason than the high sunk
costs involved. However, other freight transportation industries, like the trucking
or the barge industry, can be considered as equivalent substitutes to the

38 Knieps p. 46.
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railroads in some contexts. This means that the railroads sometimes directly
compete with other surface freight carriers.

4. Pricing rule for the natural monopoly.
Potential competition via substitutes sets new standards for defining price
ceilings for natural monopolies. It has been shown that under a natural
monopoly the rule price equal to marginal cost may not be feasible because of
losses the monopolist would incur. This is because of the high fixed cost which
does not affect marginal cost at all. The general problem a monopolist faces is
that he must charge a markup on marginal cost to recover his fixed cost. The
difficulty has always been how to determine the markup.

A well known method to determine the markup on marginal cost is
Ramsey pricing.39 The premises for Ramsey pricing is that the monopolist earns
no rent and that social welfare is maximized. According to the Ramsey price
rule, a monopolistic firm perfectly price discriminates by charging a markup on
products in inverse proportion to demand elasticity. But, in the case of railroads,
Ramsey pricing does not conform with the provision of universal service and fair
rates. In rural areas that are served by only one railroad, demand elasticity will
be lower (i.e., fewer choices) than elsewhere so the railroads will charge higher

39 Ramsey, 1927, p. 41.
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rates in rural areas. Therefore, Ramsey pricing is an inadequate means for
setting railroad rates and rate ceilings, respectively.

In 1981, The ICC40 adopted the concept of stand-alone costs for
determining rate ceilings for railroads. As acknowledged by the ICC, the concept
of stand-alone costs (SAC) was derived from the contestable market theory. “A
rate level calculated by the SAC methodology represents the theoretical
maximum rate a railroad could levy on shippers without substantial diversion of
traffic to a hypothetical competing service.”41 The hypothetical competing service
is assumed to earn no rent, hence stand-alone costs are equal to its long run
average total costs. Thus, the concept of stand-alone costs is based on two
principles. First, it is based on the principle of potential entry because stand
alone costs are equal to the price an entrant would charge. Second, stand-alone
costs have the character of opportunity costs because shippers are charged
rates they would have to pay for the second favorable alternative. However,
stand-alone costs do not constitute opportunity costs of production from the point
of view of society as marginal cost do. Consequently, stand-alone costs do not
maximize social welfare but rather minimize shippers’ losses. In addition, it
might be hard to determine the long run average total costs of a hypothetical
competing service in practice.

40 Interstate Commerce Commission, the regulatory authority over U.S. surface transportation,
established in 1887 under the Interstate Commerce Act, abolished in 1995.
41 Baumol, 1988, p. 507.

29

D.

The Cartel
A cartel is created when several firms explicitly agree to act in concert by

jointly limiting the quantity of output they produce and jointly setting an uniform
price.42 Railroads’ former practice of collective ratemaking is a form of cartel.43
The effects of a cartel on the market are the same as under monopoly: reduced
output quantity, higher price, and increased joint profits of the participants. In the
U.S., cartels are illegal under the Sherman Act44 for purposes of domestic trade.
Figure 4 on page 29 depicts the basic mechanism of the cartel in the case of two
participating firms.
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Figure 4: Cartel Production

42 Shows, pp. 388-391. For an analytical approach See, Stiegler, 1964.
43 Popper, 1996, p. 26.
44 The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1) declares illegal existing conspiracies and combinations in
restraint to trade and disproportionately to the firms legal business interests (section 1) and
attempts to create them (section 2).
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Assuming a market demand D, the cartel maximizes joint profits by setting
joint output quantity (Qc) where joint marginal cost (MCc = mca + mcb) is equal to
marginal revenue (MCc = MR). This yields a uniform price pc. Output is allocated
across participating firms in a way that yields maximum efficiency. That is,
production in each individual firm i occurs where mq = MR, which yields outputs
of qa and qb respectively (where qa + qb= Qc) ar|d joint profits

n c = [p c - a t c a{qa) \q a + [p c - a t c b(qb)\q b .

However, a cartel is not stable. Provided the uniform price pc is sustained,
each individual firm has an incentive to expand production to q’a and q’b
respectively in order to maximize its own profit (i.e., pc = mCj = mrj). But this
behavior would yield a joint output Q’c which would cause market price to fall and
to make the cartel worse off than before. Therefore, to ensure the stability of the
cartel, output quantity must be strictly controlled by the participating firms, each
of which has the incentive to cheat the others.
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CHAPTER III.

FEDERAL REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN
THE U.S. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY

A.

From the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 to the Motor
Carrier Act in 1935
During the second half of the 19th century the extension of the U.S.

railroads had been heavily pushed ahead since the railroads had a crucial role in
the opening up the west.45 The railroads were the first large firms in the U.S. As
natural monopolies, the railroad industry exhibited some of the undesirable
consequences of monopolies: namely price discrimination and destructive
competition. The former constituted a rationale for regulation on the part of
shippers and government, the latter constituted a rationale for regulation on the
part of the railroads themselves in order to end price wars and to stabilize rates.46

With the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 the railroads
were regulated at federal level.47 The Interstate Commerce Act also established

45 Wood, 1990, p. 116.
46 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 2.
47 Winston, 1990, p. 7.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the federal regulatory agency that
subsequently became responsible for regulation of all other modes of surface
transportation. In detail, the Interstate Commerce Act contained the following
major sections:48

1. All rates were to be “just and reasonable.” Unjust and unreasonable rates
were prohibited and declared unlawful.
2. Preferential treatment of individuals by special rates, rebates, drawbacks or
other devices was declared “unjust discrimination” and made unlawful.
3. Undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, company,
firm, area or type of traffic was declared unlawful.
4. It was made illegal to charge more for a short haul than for a longer one,
exemptions were feasible in the presence of competition.49
5. Pooling of traffic or earnings was prohibited.
6. Railroads were required to publish rates. Increases requires ten days notice.
7. Railroads were prohibited from breaking continuous movements of freight in
order to circumvent the act.
8. Carriers were to be liable for damages for violation of the Act.

The Act did not address a prevalent form of price discrimination used by
the railroads, the practice of “value-of-service-pricing” (also denoted as “ad
valorem pricing”). Under value-of-service-pricing, freight rates were proportional
to the value of the commodity carried which meant low rates for agricultural

48 Noll, 1983, p. 117.
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products and high rates for manufactured goods. Value-of-service-pricing is a
rough approximation of Ramsey price discrimination based on elasticity. This
rate structure was beneficial for all parties involved. Railroads could recover
their fixed cost, farmers and homesteaders had an incentive to settle the western
lands and emerging western industries were protected from eastern
competition.50 In its first annual report the ICC expressly approved of the
practice of value-of-service-pricing.51

The Hepburn Act of 1906 gave the ICC jurisdiction over maximum rates.
The Transportation Act of 1920 gave the ICC authority to regulate minimum
rates/entry, exit, capital formation, and mergers. At that time the railroads were
still the main carrier in the US. In 1948 the ICC was empowered by the Reed
Bulwinkle Act to exempt collective rate making by railroads from prosecution
under the Sherman Act.52 Then, railroads entirely set their rates lawfully, in a
cartel fashion, and collectively through rate bureaus.53

49 This shows the difference between law price discrimination and economic price discrimination.
See, Footnote 20 on page 19.
50 Friedlaender, 1981, p. 106.
51 ICC, 1887, p. 36. In: Friedlaender, 1981, p. 106.
52 Noll, p. 118. Collective rate making is like price fixing under cartel and hence was viewed as a
combination in restraint to trade. Congressional action clarified the legitimacy of this collective
action. See also Footnote 44 on page 29.
53 Rate bureaus are committees formed by common carriers to set rates. See Wood, 1990, p.
525.
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B.

Emergence of Competing Modes
In the 1920s the trucking industry began to grow rapidly. Entry into the

trucking industry was easy because entrants incurred - in comparison to
railroads - minimal sunk costs. Technological advances such as development of
the pneumatic tire and the gasoline engine, assembly line production and the
construction of paved roads facilitated transportation of goods by truck and
pushed truck rates down. Moreover, especially in the transportation of high
value manufactured goods, trucks had two distinct advantages over railroads:
First, the value-of-service pricing standard made rail rates on manufactured
goods artificially high. Second, transportation by rails bore a high risk of damage
due to slack action of cars in hump yards.54 Interstate trucking threatened to
disrupt the railroads’ cartel by undercutting rates. Not surprisingly, the railroads
were the first advocates of federal regulation of interstate trucking arguing that
the limitation of entry into the trucking industry and regulated rates would restore
“order” in the transportation industry.55 That is, the railroads’ price cartel could be
stabilized. Later entry regulation was also supported by the trucking industry that
speculated entry regulation would benefit firms already in the industry.

54 GAO, 1993, p. 15.
55 Noll, 1983, p. 119.
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In 1935 Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act that expanded the ICC’s
regulatory authority over interstate trucking.56 Regulation was imposed in three
areas: (1) entry (prospective entrants had to prove that additional service was
needed), (2) rates, and (3) securities, acquisitions, and related financial
transactions and agreements.57 Motor carriers were divided up into three types,
common, contract and private carriers.58 Private carriers and carriers of
agricultural commodities were granted exempt carrier status and they were not
subject to ICC regulation.59 Railroads were not allowed to acquire trucking firms
unless the transaction would promote the public interest and the trucking service
would be used to public advantage and would not unduly restrain competition.”60

56 The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 created the office of Federal Coordinator
of Transportation whose duty was to make a study of means for “improving conditions
surrounding transportation in all its forms and the preparation of plans therefore” (Emergency
Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, chap. 91, 48 Stat. 211). Joseph B. Eastman, an ICC
commissioner, was named coordinator. His report was submitted to senate on March 10th, 1934.
It included a draft bill which became the basis for the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The rationale for
limiting entry into the motor carrier industry was that virtually all other attempts to regulate motor
carrier transportation by the states and by foreign nation included such provisions (See, Noll, pp.
119-121).
57 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 111.
58 For an explanation see, Classification by Type of Contract on page 93.
59 Wood, 1990, p. 38.
^49 U.S.C. 11344 (c). This provision was originally contained in Section 213 (a) (1) of the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 (Public Law 74-498).
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Large number of small buyers
and sellers

In 1929, there were 3.5 million trucks in the US.61 In 1935,
after the passage of the MCA, 900,000 trucking firms
applied for “grandfather rights”.62

All firms maximize profit

It can be assumed with complete certainty that all firms in
the industry practice profit maximization.

Free and costless entry and exit

A trucking business can be run as a sole proprietorship.
The only main asset that is required is the truck itself. A
truck is not fixed to a certain route and can be sold off at
present market value at any time. There are potential but no
implicit economics of size in the trucking industry.63
Therefore, entry and exit are free and costless.

Potential entrants face the same
market demands as those
available to incumbent firms.
Products are homogenous,
consequently there is no brand
loyalty

The trucking industry is fragmented, consequently both
firms and entrants face a small, qualitatively identical equal
share of demand. Asymmetry in service can be eliminated
easily

Potential entrants face the same
productive techniques as those
available to incumbent firms

In the trucking industry, the basic productive technique is
the truck. Trucks are mass products, therefore entrants face
the same productive techniques as those available to
incumbent firms.

Equal access to input markets,
especially equal access to factor
prices

Input factors in the trucking industry are fuel, spare parts,
stationary and telephone service. All are mass products.
Therefore, both firms and entrants have equal access to
input markets and factor prices.

Table I: Application Of The Model Of Perfect Competition In The Trucking Industry.

61 Dempsey, 1989, p. 16.
62 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 112. Motor carrier businesses that had existed before the passage of
the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) were allowed to continue operations under “grandfather rights”.
Accordingly, there were at least 900,000 trucking firms in the U.S. in 1935.
63 In the railroad industry there are intrinsic economics of size due to the physical structure of the
industry (decreasing cost industry). In the trucking industry it needs to be distinguished between
TL and LTL sector. See The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 on page 95. In 1935 there were quite less
size economics in the trucking industry than nowadays. By 1967 Nelson (Nelson, 1967, p. 323)
states that there are no size economics in the trucking industry. By 1986, Glaskowsky
(Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 9, p. 65) acknowledges distinct economics of size in the LTL sector. For a
quantitative analysis of economics of size in the common carriers of general commodities see
Friedlaender, 1980, p. 173.
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At this time it is worthwhile to consider whether the structure of the
trucking industry justifies regulation in principle. In the following it is examined to
what extend the trucking industry can be regarded purely competitive. In Table I
on page 36 all criteria that make up pure competition are evaluated for the
trucking industry.

Table I on page 36 shows that the trucking industry is structurally purely
competitive. This implies that the trucking industry, left to the “invisible hand
forces” of the free market, would adjust in an equilibrium where both firms and
consumers enjoy equal shares of welfare. In that sense, social welfare is
maximized. Consequently, in the face of welfare consideration no regulation is
necessary. This result proves that the regulation of the interstate trucking
industry in 1935 has not been established on grounds of welfare or allocative
considerations. Given the situation of railroads and existing trucking firms at that
time suggests that railroads and incumbent trucking companies have exerted
their influence in establishing regulation of the trucking industry for their own
benefit. Further, the Transportation Act of 1935 backed up the ICC’s desire to
keep freight rates low on shipments of large-volume, low-value agricultural
products, presuming these low rates preserved the railroads’ value-of-service
rate structure.64

64 For detailed explanations see Kahn, 1971, p. 14.
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Although the trucking industry is the most direct competitor of the railroad
industry, there are other modes of transportation that can be at least partly
regarded as competing modes to the railroad industry. These are the barge
industry, the pipeline industry, and the airline industry. Concerning passenger
traffic, the intercity bus industry and the airline industry can be regarded as
competing modes. Since this study confines itself to freight traffic, passenger
traffic is left out of further consideration. All of these industries have been
regulated and then deregulated later. Table II on page 39 provides an overview
of the area of regulation with respect to different transportation modes that are
potentially suitable to compete with railroads. Because these modes are partly
suitable to compete with railroads for shipments, they must be included in
considerations about the relevant market of railroads.
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1887 Interstate
Commerce Act

ICC
STB

(since 1996)65

1980 Staggers
Rail Act66

Interstate
Trucking

1935
Motor Carrier Act

ICC
STB

(since 1996)

1980 Motor
Carrier Act67

Natural Gas
Pipelines

1938

FPC68
FERC (since 1977)69

Oil Pipelines

1906
Hepburn Act70

ICC
FERC

Airlines

1938 Civil
Aeronautics Act

CAB71

Inland Water
Carriers (“barges”)

1940 Transportation
Act72

ICC
STB

Railroads

(since 1977)

1978 Airline De
regulation Act

(since 1996)

Table II: Regulation And Deregulation Of Transportation Modes.

65 The ICC had been abolished by 12/31/95. Most of its remaining authority has been transferred
to the Surface Transportation Board (STB), an independent body attached to the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT). See, Omaha Word Herald, 11/22/95.
66 Under the Staggers Act the railroad industry was not fully deregulated, although the Staggers
Act is regarded as the threshold towards deregulation.
67 Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 interstate trucking was not fully deregulated, although the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is regarded as the threshold towards deregulation.
68 Federal Power Commission (FPC). See, Wood, 1990, p. 147.
69 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent body created by the new U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977. See, Wood, 1990, p. 146.
70 Wood, 1990, p. 37.
71 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
72 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 22.
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C.

Movement towards Deregulation
After 1935, two developments favored the trucking industry rather than the

railroads. First, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 immensely pushed ahead
the improvement of the interstate-high way system. It created the Highway Trust
Fund which received its funds exclusively from highway-use taxes. Its goal was
to construct a sophisticated 40,000 mile long highway system throughout the
U.S.73 Second, as a result of industrial growth, high-value manufactured goods
accounted for an increasing share of the total amount of goods carried. The
establishment of manufacturing industries in suburban areas where no railroad
terminals were available also favored trucking service.74

Figure 5 on page 41 and Figure 6 on page 42 depict the volume
distribution of intercity freight traffic with respect to modes for the period from
1939 to 1995. It is clearly visible that particularly the trucking industry diverted
traffic away from the railroads. Kahn blames the ICC ratemaking for the
diversion of traffic.75 Although rail and truck rates were set commonly, it was
feasible to circumvent ICC regulation through the (truck) exempt carrier status.
Exempt carriers invaded the common carrier market by leasing out their trucks at
cut-rates to common carriers for the return trip or by fictionally purchasing the

73 Wood, 1990, p. 94.
74 Meyer, 1974, p. 142.
75 Kahn, 1971, p. 19.
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goods for the period of transit. Not bound by rates set by the ICC, exempt
carriers were free to quote whatever charges they pleased and to undercut
railroad rates that were set by the ICC. In 1964, about two-thirds of intercity
truck ton-miles were handled by exempt motor carriers.76
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Figure 5: Estimated Volume Distribution Of Intercity Freight Traffic, Public And Private, In TonMiles,77 By Modes O f Transport, 1939 - 1995.78

76 Kahn, 197.1, p. 21. According to the 1963 Census of Transportation, in 1963 42,986 of the
57,800 motor carriers in the U.S. in that year were exempt carriers.
77 For explanation see Weight/Distance on page 55.
78 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a5.
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Figure 6: Estimated Volume Distribution Of Intercity Freight Traffic, Public And Private, As
Percentage Of Total Ton-Miles Carried, By Modes Of Transport, 1939 - 1995.79

In addition to drawbacks due to structural changes and regulation itself,
inflexible labor contracts put a heavy cost burden on the railroads.80 The oil
crises in the early 1970s made the main input factor of railroads more expensive
and slowed demand for railroad service down. On the other hand, the ICC
approved proposed abandonments of unprofitable lines only with reluctance to
maintain the railroads’ common-carrier obligation.

79 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a5.
80 Keeler, 1983, p. 50.
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Economists point out that regulation may in fact stipulate costs that may
outweigh the social gains of regulation. Regulation may impose costs on society
(1) in the form of administrative costs and (2) in the form of opportunity costs
caused by resource misallocation (as a result of rate of return regulation and ad
valorem pricing81) and creation of excess capacity (as a result of the commoncarrier obligation82) on part of producers and distortion o f demand. Regulation
was also said to stifle innovation. Different econometric studies on the effects of
regulation have been conducted. In the view of social losses incurred through
regulation many of them argue for deregulation.83

Excess capacity was seen as prevalent impediment to efficiency. Mergers
have traditionally been regarded as potential remedy. In 1920, Congress
directed the ICC to conduct a study to consolidate the railroads into 18 to 20
railroads.84 Congress adopted the plan in 1929 but it was never realized. In the
early 1960s the argument for merger was that railroads operating at efficient size
were able to apply a rate system which was more closely based on costs (in
contrast to the prevalent value-of-service pricing system) which in turn would

81 Denoted Averch-Johnson Effect, See, Averch, 1962.
82 For an econometric model see Levin, 1981. Levin finds that excess capacity (low density lines)
is a primary source of the unprofitability of the U.S. railroad industry.
83 For a full discussion of the economical consequences of regulation, see Friedlaender, 1969,
Chapter 4 (includes references). See also Peck, Merton J.: Competitive Policy for Transportation;
in: John R. Meyer and others: The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries,
Chaps. 6 and 7; Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA, 1959. Also see: Boyer, Kenneth D.:
The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation; Rand Journal of Economics;
Vol. 18, pp. 408-416, Autumn 1987.
84 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 138.
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increase economic efficiency in the transport sector. Friedlaender identifies sideby-side mergers of line-haul railroads operating in the same territory as most
suitable form of mergers that would reduce excess capacity.85 Friedlaender also
notes that mergers would increase market power of the remaining railroads
substantially which would require regulation to be even more extensive.86

As a result of financial difficulties, many railroads were forced into
bankruptcy. The industry’s average rate of return (see Figure 7 on page 45)
stayed well below the 5.5 percent that the ICC regarded as an adequate rate of
return.87 Most of the bankrupt railroads were acquired by or merged into
financially sound railroads. The continuously poor financial situation of the
railroad industry led to deterioration of track infrastructure due to deferred
maintenance. Low speed and high accident rates made railroad transportation
less attractive. Rolling stock often was in better condition since it was operated
under lease.88 During the 1970s approximately 20% of the railroad industry
operated under bankruptcy.89

85 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 139. See also Footnote 156 on page 78.
86 Friedlaender, 1969, p. 140.
87 Muller, 1988, p. 182.
88 Muller, 1988, p. 191.
89 Wood, 1990, p. 129.
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Class I Railroads' Rate of Return, 1928-1995
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Figure 7: Class I Railroads:90 Rate Of Return 1938 - 1995.91

In the 1970s, federal government countered these developments in order
to improve the financial situation with the ultimate goal to improve railroad
transportation service. The main provisions are listed below.

90 For details about railroad classes, see on page 93.
91 Data from Moody, 1996, p. a19. Years 1970-1981 include deferred taxes. Years 1982/83:
Computations based on new depreciation Accounting System, computations also reflect the
elimination of investment tax credit from net railway operating income. Not comparable to
previous years.
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1.

Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970

The main provisions of the Rail Passenger Service Act92 were:

■ Creation of Amtrak: The federal government took over the remaining intercity
passenger service. Passenger service had become unprofitable due to
substitution by private car traffic.
■ Railroads were granted greater autonomy in ratemaking and abandonment
and merger processes were eased.
■ The ICC was given authority to eliminate rate regulation where it served "little
or no useful public purpose" and was ordered to consider railroad revenue
needs in judging rate reasonableness.

However, the ICC complied with the new rules reluctantly.93

2.

Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970

The Emergency Rail Services Act94 authorized federal loan guarantees for
bankrupt carriers. Background was the acute financial shortage of the Penn
Central Railroad. It was estimated that the Penn Central alone would need
additional $100,000,000 to survive the first quarter of 1971.95

92 Wood, 1990, p. 27.
93 Wilner, 1990.
94 Wilner, 1990.
95 House Report 91-1770, 12/16/70.
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3.

Regional Rail Reorganization (3-R) Act of 1973

The preceding event that finally led to the 3-R Act was the bankruptcy of
the Penn Central Railroad in 1970.96 The Penn Central resulted from a merger
of three eastern railroads in 1968 and was the nation’s largest transportation
company at that time. Under the 3-R Act most of the former Penn Central
Railroad and five eastern railroads were merged into Consolidated Railroad
Corporation (Conrail). Conrail finally became profitable in 1981. At that time it
had consumed $7.5 billion in federal subsidies.

In addition, the 3-R Act authorized more governmental loan guarantees,
and added direct grants and temporary operating subsidies for bankrupts.

4.

Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4-R) Act of
1976

The 4-R Act was targeted at “efforts to restructure the [railroad industry]
on a more economically justified basis.”97 Its major provision was to systematize
the abandonment process and the extension of the subsidy program
nationwide.98

96 Dempsey, 1989, p. 157.
97 45 U.S.C. § 801 (a) (2) (1982). In Dempsey, 1989, p. 151.
98 Due, 1990, p. 18.
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5.

The Staggers Rail Act of 1980

Section 2 of the Staggers Rail A c t" states:

“The Congress hereby finds that
(1) historically, railroads were the essential factor in the national
transportation system;
(2) the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act was essential to
prevent an abuse of monopoly power by railroads and to establish
and maintain a national railroads network;
(3) today, most transportation within the United States is
competitive;
(4) many of the Government regulations affecting railroads have
become unnecessary and inefficient;
(5) nearly two-thirds of the Nation’s intercity freight is transported by
modes of transportation other than railroads;
(6) earnings by the railroad industry are the lowest of any
transportation mode and are insufficient to generate funds of
necessary capital improvements;
(7) by 1985, there will be a capital shortfall within the railroad
industry of between $16,000,000,000 and $20,000,000,000;
(8) failure to achieve increased earnings within the railroad industry
will result in either further deterioration of the rail system or the
necessity for additional Federal subsidy; and
(9) modernization of economic regulation for the railroad industry
with a greater reliance on the marketplace is essential in order to
achieve maximum utilization of railroads to save energy and
combat inflation.”

99 Public Law 96-448; 96th Congress; Oct. 14, 1980. For a brief summary see: “Deregulation:
What happens next?”; Railway Age, Vol. 181, p. 10; October 27th, 1980.
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The Staggers Rail Act is enormously complex and often highly specific. It
governs railroad rates and inter-carrier practices (Title II), railroad cost
determinations (Title III), railroad modernization assistance (Title IV), and
provisions for Conrail and other railroads and organizations. Its main provisions
are:100

a.

Zone o f Rate Flexibility

Generally under the Staggers Act, each railroad may set its rates
independently of the ICC and rate bureaus. Railroads were permitted to
increase rates by 6 percent per year until 1984 with an aggregate increase to not
more than 118 percent of the 1980 rates. After 1984, rates may raise by 4
percent per year. The ICC may allow additional adjustments for inflation. There
were provisions for surcharges in some cases such as interline traffic and on
branch lines. Rates had not to be lower than variable cost.101

Rates were subject to ICC regulation only in markets where the railroad
possessed market dominance. Market dominance meant an absence of
effective competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the
transportation to which a rate applies.102 In those markets rates had to be

100 Public Law 96-448, see also Wood, p. 129.
101 Railroads may set rates below variable cost to engage in predatory pricing.
102 49 U.S.C. § 10707 (a).
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“reasonable”. That is, it had not to exceed 160 percent of variable cost. This
percentage was raised subsequently to 180 percent in 1984. A shipper
challenging a rate had the burden of proving that the rate is not reasonable if the
rate exceeded the applicable revenue-variable cost percentage for the particular
by less than 20 percent or if the revenue-variable cost percentage is lower than
190.

b.

Contract Rates

Contracts between railroads and individual shippers were legalized. A
summary of nonconfidential contract terms had to be filed with the ICC. Rates,
shipper, origin and destination did not have to be disclosed. Railroads were not
allowed to commit more than 40% of their cars for agricultural products to
contracts.103

c.

Consolidation, Merger, and Acquisition o f Control

Existing guidelines were not changed in principle. Applications for
transactions had to be filed with the ICC which approved or rejected the
application. The ICC is required to consider at least (A) the effect of the
proposed transaction on the adequacy of transportation to the public; (B) the
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effect on the public interest of including, or failing to include, other rail carriers in
the area involved in the proposed transaction; (C) the total fixed charges that
result from the proposed transaction; (D) the interest of carriers employees
affected by the proposed transaction; (E) whether the proposed transaction
would have an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected
region.104 The Staggers Act eased transactions insofar that the considerations
stated above must be made only if the transactions involves at least two Class I
railroads.105 ICC merger approval conferred automatic antitrust immunity over
these transactions.106 Provisions for acquisition of motor carriers were not
changed.107

d.

Abandonment

Railroads were still required to file applications for abandonments with the
ICC, however, proceedings were further streamlined.108

103 For a brief summary see “ICC issues rules on contract rates”; Railway Age, Vol. 181, p. 12;
November 10th, 1980.
104 49 U.S.C. § 11344 (b); clause (E) is added by the Staggers Act.
105 Public Law 96-448, Sec. 228.
106 Dempsey, 1989, p. 160.
107 See Footnote 60 on page 35.
108 Public Law 96-448, Sec. 402.
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6.

Assessment of the Staggers Rail Act

The Staggers Act expressively favors the railroad industry. The federal
government recognized the railroads’ economic plight under regulation. It has
identified other modes of surface transportation - mainly the trucking industry - a
real competitor for transportation. Although railroads constitute a natural
monopoly with all its drawbacks and risks for public interest, deregulation is
justified on the grounds of competition with the trucking industry. In economic
terms that is, through competing with the trucking industry the railroad market will
adjust at a socially optimal equilibrium.

With the Staggers Act railroads mainly gain control over ratemaking, an
extremely valuable tool to work out individual pricing and marketing strategies.
This, in turn, provides options to differentiate and to attract particular market
segments. On the other hand, since railroads constitute a natural monopoly,
pricing autonomy also confers ability to exploit market power. True, the Staggers
Act provides some remedies for abuse of market power. Nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to consider these remedies. Under the Staggers Act, both the zone
for rate flexibility and the threshold for market power are defined in dependence
on variable cost. Variable cost is a quantity internal to a firm that cannot be
determined accurately from the outside. On the other hand, hurt shippers have
the burden to prove that rates are outside the permitted zone. Given the nature
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of variable cost, shippers have extreme difficulties to set forth that proof. On the
contrary, the provisions allow some leeway to manipulate on part of the railroads.

The political circumstances prevalent in 1980 give some indications that
the movement towards railroad deregulation was not only economically but also
politically motivated. First, through the bankruptcy of Conrail the federal
government became directly involved in the poor economical condition of the
railroads. The drain of considerable funds as subsidy for Conrail, which is
located in the densely populated area immediately surrounding Washington,
certainly had a stronger impact on decision makers than supposedly captive
shippers109 being scattered somewhere in the West. Second, the airline industry
that had been deregulated in 1978 exhibited some noticeably positive effects of
deregulation immediately after deregulation.110 Consequently, deregulation was
perceived to be a step into the right direction. Moreover, critics of deregulation
hold that the ICC has become subsequently politicized.111 Since 1969, the
President of the United States possessed the authority do designate the
chairman among the commissioners of the ICC.112 Beginning in the Ford
administration, all appointees to become ICC commissioners were strong
advocates of deregulation. The most prominent example was its chairman

109 A shipper is denoted a captive shipper if its facility is served by one railroad and, due to
volume or commodity constraints, another mode could not practicably be used to transport the
traffic.
110 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 37.
111 Dempsey, 1989, p. 223.
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appointed by President Carter, the economist Darius Gaskins. This politicization
of the ICC brought about an interpretation of rules in favor of railroads.113

112 83 Stat. 859 (1969). In Dempsey, 1989, p. 233.
113 Friedlaender 1981, p. 103.
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CHAPTER IV.

OUTCOME OF DEREGULATION IN THE U.S.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
In this section of the study, outcomes of deregulation in the U.S. surface
transportation industry will be examined. Based on the outcomes of deregulation
in the U.S. surface transportation industry, the remaining part of this study it is
analyzed (1) whether deregulation has achieved its economical goals and (2)
whether anticompetitive effects have emerged. This chapter starts with a brief
introduction of Industry Specific Measures and Classifications.

A.

Industry Specific Measures and Classifications
1.

Industry Specific Measures
a.

Weight/Distance

A ton-mile is the movement of a ton the distance of one mile. A revenue
ton-mile (also denoted freight revenue ton-mile) is the movement of the weight
of a ton the distance of one mile where the railroad earns revenue for hauling
that ton.
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b.

Mileage

Miles of road owned is the aggregate length of roadway, excluding yard
tracks and sidings, and does not reflect the parallel tracks. In contrast, miles of
track owned includes multiple main tracks, yard tracks and sidings. Miles
operated are miles of road owned plus trackage rights.

A train-mile is the movement of a train the distance of one mile. Train
miles are based on the distance run between terminals.

2.

Classifications of Railroads

There are three different classifications for railroads.
(a)

Historically, all railroads had to report financial operating information to

the ICC. Consequently, the ICC has classified railroads by their level of
operating revenue into three classes. The revenue class thresholds have been
changed in the past. Last changes were made in 1991 when the ICC set flexible
thresholds adjusted annually for inflation. For 1994, Class I Railroads had
operating revenue of $ 255.9 million or more114; Class II Railroads had revenues
of $ 20.5 million to 255.9 million; and Class III Railroads had revenues of less

114 Since 1991, railroads with annual gross revenues of $250,000,000 or more, adjusted annually
for inflation, are classified as Class I Railroads. For previous years, see Figure 9 on page 60.
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than $ 20.5 million. This classification system has been taken over by the STB in
1996.115

(b) Railroads can also be classified by the nature and scope of their
business as Line-haul, Switching and Terminal Railroads.

(c) The Association of American Railroads (AAR) classifies railroads into
Class I, Regional, and Local Railroads. For Class I Railroads the AAR has
adopted the STB definition. Regional Railroads are line-haul railroads that
operate at least 350 miles of road and/or earning revenue between $40 million
and the Class I threshold. Local Railroads are line haul railroads falling below
the regional criteria, plus all Switching and Terminal Railroads.

.

Figure 8 on page 58 depicts number, miles operated, number of
employees, and freight revenue by type of railroad for 1995.

115 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 3.
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Figure 8: Industry Totals By Type O f Railroad For 1997.116

a.

Dominance o f Class I Railroads

The railroad industry has always been dominated by Class I railroads.
Generically, Class I railroads operate long-haul freight trains carrying a
considerable number of freight tons which in turn generate a large amount of ton
miles and high total revenues. In contrast, revenues and hence operations of
regional and local railroads are considerably lower due to fewer ton miles
generated. Figure 8 on page 58 and Figure 9 on page 60 indicate that Class I
railroads always have accounted for the main share of total ton miles, total

116 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 3. Data modified for 01/01/97.
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freight revenue, total miles operated, and number of employees. Therefore, this
study will focus on Class I railroads.

B.

Concentration of Class I Railroads
Concentration has never been unusual in the railroad industry.117 In the

past, both potential gains and potential drawbacks of concentration have been
scrutinized and their consequences are well known.118 The Staggers Act did not
change existing consolidation guidelines in principle.119 Merger approval by the
ICC conferred automatic antitrust immunity.120 Figure 9 on page 60 shows that
the number of Class I railroads has been declining constantly. The drop of Class
I railroads in the 1970s can be traced to mergers following bankruptcies and to
the redefinition of Class I railroads in 1978 (Figure 9 on page 60). Consolidation
has often been a process over several years, starting with partial acquisition,
subsequent acquisition of a controlling interest by the parent, and finally a
merger into the parent.121

117 See Conant, 1964.
118 See Footnote 84 on page 43.
119 See Consolidation, Merger, and Acquisition of Control on page 50.
120 See Footnote 106 on page 51.
121 Firm combinations can be classified (1) by the scope of business of the combining firms and
(2) by the method of consummating the combination. (1) (a) Horizontal combination: The
combining firms are located in the same industry and at the same stage of the value chain; (b)
vertical combination: The combining firms are located at different stages of the value chain
(upstream or downstream); (c) unrelated combination: There is no direct relation between the
combining firms. (2) (a) Statutory merger. At least one firm is absorbed into another one and
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Class I Railroads: Number of firms, share of total line-haul mileage,
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Figure 9: Class I Railroads: Number O f Firms, Share Of Total Line-Haul Mileage, Annual
Revenue Threshold For Class I Railroads, 1970 - 1996.122

ceases to exist; (b) statutory consolidation: At least one firm is absorbed into a specifically new
created firm which is the only remaining firm; (c) asset acquisition: If no controlling interest is
acquired, the selling firm survives, if a controlling interest is acquired, the selling firm may survive
as subsidiary; (d) stock acquisition: Both firms survive, the parent has an intercompany
investment and may have a controlling interest.
122 Number of Class I Railroads: The number reflects the number of firms by 12/31 in that year
except for the years 1977/78/79. Data for the year 1977 reflect Class I Railroads as of 12/31/76,
Data for the year 1978 reflect Class I Railroads as of 03/07/78, data for the year 1979 reflect
Class I Railroads as of October 1979. See also Footnote 114. Share of total line-haul mileage:
Association of American Railroads, PL&E Department, 1997. For explanation see
Weight/Distance on page 55. See also Figure 15.
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The consolidation trend further continued after 1980. Figure 9 on page 60
indicates that the number of Class I railroads has dropped from 39 to 9 since
1980. However, Class I railroads’ share of total line-haul mileage has not
changed significantly over these years. In 1970, 69 firms accounted for 85% of
the total mileage where in 1996 just 9 firms accounted for 78% of the total
mileage. Figure 10 on page 63 and Figure 11 on page 64 show the
development of consolidation in more detail. The 69 Class I railroads that
existed 1970 have since consolidated into nine Class I railroads or have dropped
out of the Class I category (mainly due to class redefinitions). Figure 12 on page
65 depicts the proportions of the nine Class I railroads that presently exist.
These firms can be subdivided into the major five and four minor railroads. Four
of the five major railroads emerged during the 1980s. The fifth, Conrail, was
created in the 1970s by virtue of law following the bankruptcy of the Penn
Central Railroad.123 Two of the minor Class I railroads were controlled by the
Canadian Railroads.124 The consolidation trend did not halt yet. Presently,
Conrail is to be shared out among CSX and Norfolk Southern.125 In June, 1997,
Union Pacific gained an interest in Mexico’s North Pacific Railroad which

123 See Regional Rail Reorganization (3-R) Act of 1973 on page 47.
124 see Footnote 129 on page 65.
125 Carey, 1997.
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connects Union Pacific as far as Mexico City.126 Facing increased transportation
volume in conjunction with NAFTA, this is an important strategic step.

126 Omaha World Herald, 06/27/97.
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yearl 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 191 92 93 94 95 96
Burlington Northern R.R.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.
Colorado & Southern Ry.
Fort Worth & Denver Ry.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R.
Oregon Electric Ry. Co.
Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey
Erie-Lackawanna Ry. Co.
Lehigh Valley R.R.
Penn Central Transportation Co.
Reading Co.
Ann Arbor R.R.
Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines
CSX Corp.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Chesapeaeke & Ohio Ry.
Western Maryland Ry.
Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Clinchfield R.R.
Georgia R.R., Lessee Organization
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R.
Atlanta & West Point R.R. Co.
Western Ry. of Alabama
Monon R.R.
Grand Trunk W estern R.R.
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R.
Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific Ry.
Central Vermont Ry., Inc.
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R.
Illinois Central R.R.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.
Norfolk Southern
Southern Ry.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
Central of Georgia Ry.
Alabama Great Southern R.R.
Cinncinati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry.
Georgia Southern & Florida Ry.
Illinois Terminal R.R.
Akron, Canton & Youngston R.R.
Soo Line R.R.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R.
Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Ry.
Union Pacific R.R.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
Chicago & North Western Ry. System
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.
Missouri Pacific R.R.
Western Pacific R.R.
Northwestern Pacific R.R.
Texas & Pacific Ry.
Chicago & Easten Illinois R.R.
Missouri-lllinois R.R.
Spokane International R.R. Co.

Figure 10: Class I Railroads ultimately merged into, acquired by or controlled by majority by 1997
Class I Railroads, 1970 - 1997.127

127 Moody, 1996, editions 1971-1996. A dot indicates that the railroad was listed as Class I
railroad by 12/31 in that year. The vertical lines indicate years of major redefinitions of Class I
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year
fiulford 1 ransportation Co.
Boston & Maine Corp.
Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co.
Maine Central RR
Independent Class I Railroads
Ronda East Coast Ry.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie RR
Bessemer & Lake Erie RR
Duluth, Mssabe & Iran Range Ry.
Long Island RR
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R R
Mchigan Interstate Ry. Co.
Chicago & Illinois Mdand Ry.
Bangor & Aroostook R R
Ato-Train Corp.
Canadian Pacific Lines in Mainev
Texas Mexican Ry. Co.
Green Bay & VNfestem RR
Lake Superior Ishpemng RR
Monongahela Ry., Co.
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Figure 11: Class I Railroads Not Merged Into Or Acquired By Other Class I Railroads, 1970 1997.128

railroads. See also Footnote 122, section Number of Class I Railroads. The Figure shows the
ultimate outcome of combinations only, it does not account for intermediate combinations. The
company histories were traced for data on combinations. Numbers in parentheses denote page
numbers in Moody, 1996 edition, for histories of individual companies: Burlington Northern, Inc.
(a1), Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (BNSF) (a15), Illinois Central Corp. (a28), Illinois
Central R.R. Co (a39), Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc. (a48), Kansas City Southern Railway
Company: (a69), Norfolk Southern Corp. (a76), Norfolk Southern Railway, Inc. (a89), Norfolk and
Western Railway Corp. (a101), Union Pacific Corp.: (a10), Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (a27), Union
Pacific R.R. Co. (a133), Soo Line Corp. (a215), Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (a403),
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. (a455), Grand Trunk Corp. (a243), Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. (a
245), CSX Corp. (a421), Conrail, Inc. (a416). R.R. = Railroad, Ry. = Railway.
128 Moody, editions 1971-1996. A dot indicates that the railroad was listed as class I railroad by
12/31 in that year. The vertical lines indicate years of major redefinitions of Class I railroads. See
also Footnote 122, section Number of Class I Railroads. Company histories were traced for data
on combinations (Moody, various editions). R.R. = Railroad, Ry. = Railway.
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Class I Railroads: Miles owned, revenue ton miles, operating revenue, 1995
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Figure 12: Class I Railroads: Miles Of Road Owned, Revenue Ton Miles, Operating Revenue,
1997.129

Figure 12 on page 65 does not include Amtrak because it is primarily a
passenger railroad. Amtrak was created in 1970 to take over the remaining
intercity passenger service.130 Amtrak does not own track except the “Northeast
Corridor” and some branchlines in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.131 Outside
its trackage, passenger trains are operated under trackage rights agreement with

129 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 68-77. 1995 data. Data for Union Pacific is calculated by adding data
for Union Pacific and Southern Pacific which was merged into Union Pacific in August 1996. The
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian National
Railway Company (since 1971). In 1995 it was merged into its parent. The Soo Line is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway (since 1990). (McGonigal, 1996).
130 See
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 on page 46.
131 Dooley, 1994, p. 129. The Northeast Corridor is the railroad between Washington and Boston.
Amtrak owns 750 miles of track and operates 24,500 miles of track. Its 1995 revenues were $1.25
billion (Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 78). For an overview of Amtrak’s operations, see Dooley, 1994,
Chapter 9.
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the cooperating railroads. Railroads are required to provide their tracks to
Amtrak at reasonable rates for operation of passenger services. Besides intercity
service Amtrak provides commuter service in some metropolitan areas.132

1.

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a statistical measure of market
concentration and a proxy for market power.133 It is used by the Department of
Justice (DoJ) and by the Federal Reserve Board in the analysis of competitive
effects of mergers. The HHI accounts for the number of firms as well as their
relative size (market share) in the relevant market (with respect to product and
geographic area). The HHI asserts market power increases geometrically, not
linearly, with increase in market share. The HHI is calculated by squaring the
market shares of all firm in the relevant market and then summing the squares,
as follows:

n

HHI = £ (M S i) 2 .
1= 1

A HHI approaching zero means perfect competition because this would
mean there are very many firms, all with very small market shares. In contrast, a
HHI of 10,000 means pure monopoly because one firm with 100% market share

132 Dooley, 1994, p. 144.
133 Rhoades, 1986.
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has an HHI of 10,000. However, the HHI should be applied with caution.
Although it weights larger market shares heavier than small ones (by squaring
market shares), the correlation between squared market share and
anticompetitive effects has been chosen arbitrarily. Secondly, the HHI is often
applied improperly by basing it on national market shares rather than on relevant
(local) market shares. To illustrate, assume the 1995 market shares for Class I
railroads: at the national level, the revenue ton-mile based HHI would be 2384.
However, there is no place in the U.S. that is served by all Class I railroads.
Furthermore, since railroads operate on different road networks, not every
railroad that serves a particular location will serve the destination of the shipment
which further shrinks the relevant market. Hence, the real HHI faced by
customers is always higher than the national one. For example, a local market
served by two railroads with equal market shares (assuming both railroads serve
the same destinations) would yield an HHI of 5,000.

In 1968, the Department of Justice (DoJ) published formal guidelines for
horizontal mergers which were revised in 1982, 1984, 1992, and 1997.134 The
guidelines reflect the enforcement policy of the DoJ and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) concerning horizontal mergers subject to section 7 of the
Clayton Act, to section 1 of the Sherman Act, or to section 5 of the Federal Trade
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Commission Act.135 The focus is on prevention of market power, which is defined
as “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a
significant period of time.”136 Market power is seen as a function of market
concentration. Therefore, the DoJ and the FTC apply the HHI in determining the
level of concentration. Individual market shares are based on “the best indicator
of firms’ future competitive significance.”137 The guidelines account for the
relevant market which is defined by product and geographic area. The general
standards of the guidelines are:138

1. Where the post-merger HHI is less than 1,000 (“unconcentrated market”), the
merger will be challenged only in “extraordinary circumstances”.
2. Where the post-merger HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 (“moderately
concentrated market”), and the merger increases the HHI by more than 100
points, the government is “likely” to challenge the merger unless other factors
suggest “the merger is not likely to substantially lessen competition.”
3. Where the post-merger HHI is over 1,800 (“highly concentrated market”), and
the merger increases the HHI by more than 50 points, the government is

134 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997. In the context of these guidelines, the term “merger”
encompasses all types of firm combinations. See Footnote 121 on page 59.
135 Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18) declares illegal stock or asset acquisition by any
person or business of another “where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". For section 1 of the Sherman Act see
Footnote 44 on page 29. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45)
declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.
136 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 2.
137 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 14. If firms are distinguished primarily by differentiation of
their products, then dollar sales generally will be used. If firms are distinguished primarily on the
basis of their relative advantages in serving different buyers or groups of buyers, then unit sales
generally will be used.
138 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 16.
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“likely” to challenge the merger unless other factors suggest “the merger is not
likely to substantially lessen competition.”
Judgments based on HHI values can be influenced by the following factors:

A. Collusion

Ease of collusion makes anticompetitive post-merger effects more likely and
hence will impede merger approval. Ease of collusion is examined through
proxies.

B. Entry

The Department of Justice finds: “A merger is not likely to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so easy that
market participants, after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could
not profitably maintain a price increase above premerger levels. Such entry
likely will deter an anticompetitive merger in its incipiency, or deter or
counteract the competitive effects of concern.”139 Entry is easy if it is (1)
timely, (2) likely, and (3) sufficient to deter anticompetitive behavior. An entry
alternative is considered to be timely if a significant impact on prices in the
relevant market can be achieved within two years from initial planning. An

139 U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 25.
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entry alternative is considered to be likely if it would be profitable at premerger
prices and if the entrant could secure such prices (i.e., the entrant faces the
demand corresponding to his price). An entry alternative is considered to be
sufficient if (1) the entrant has access to essential assets in the same way as
the incumbent does and (2) the character and scope of the entrant’s products
is fully responsive to local sales opportunities created by the merger.

C. E fficiencies

Greater post merger efficiencies facilitate merger approval if (1) efficiencies
are cognizable and (2) of a character and magnitude such that the merger is
not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.140

D. Failing Firm

Merger approval is facilitated if one of the merging firms is failing and will
hence exit the market anyway.

140 Cognizable efficiencies are efficiencies that can (1) unambiguously be traced to the merger
{merger-specific efficiency) and (2) do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or
service. The second condition for Cognizability was excluded in the 1992 merger guidelines. In
the 1982 guidelines, efficiencies had to be shown by "clear and convincing (in an engineering
sense)” evidence. Greater efficiency was generally excluded from the 1968 guidelines (Coate,
1994, p. 48n).
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Table III on page 71 shows the area of operation of Class I railroads. The
railroad HHI is calculated for different regions in Table IV on page 72 based upon
the data found in Figure 12 on page 65. Amtrak has been included since it
competes with freight railroads in the express freight sector.141 A HHI calculated
for large regions, such as shown in Table IV on page 76, certainly does not
accurately reflect the real situation any one local shipper. A specific shipper may
face a competitive regional market, but rail service at the shipper’s door most
likely is monopolistic.

Amtrak

United States

BNSF

West of Missouri River

Conrail

Official Territory142

CSX

East of Missouri River

Grand Trunk Western

Michigan/Great Lakes

Illinois Central

Chicago-New Orleans

Kansas City Southern

Kansas City-Gulf Coast

Norfolk Southern

East of Missouri River

Soo Line

Minnesota/Lake Michigan States

Union Pacific

West of Missouri River

Table III: Class I Railroads: Area Of Operation.143

141 Wall Street Journal, 07/30/97.
142 The Official Territory encompasses the New England, the Mid Atlantic, and the Great Lakes
States. Friedlaender, 1981, p. 110.

72

United States
West of Missouri River
Official Territory

BNSF, Conrail,
CSX, GTW, IC,
KCS, NFS, Soo, UP

1995

1853

2384

BNSF, UP

5388

4647

5229

Conrail, CSX, NFS

3384

2877

3482

CSX, NFS

5022

4229

5033

5042

4023

5058

(before sharing out of Conrail)

Official Territory
(after sharing out Conrail)

East of Missouri River
Gulf Coast

BNSF, IC, KCS, UP

4667

4078

4676

State of Ohio

CSX, NFS, Conrail,
Soo, IC, GTW,

2689

2335

2706

Table IV: Class I Railroads: HHI By Selected Regions.144

The results shown in Table IV on page 72 indicate that the HHIs for all
regions are well above the DoJ HHI threshold of 1,800 where anticompetitive
effects are likely to be prevalent. Regarding the proposed sharing out of Conrail,
the increase in the HHI will be more than 30 times higher than tolerable under
the DoJ merger guidelines of an increase in HHI of 50. The results further
confirm the theoretical consideration that regional HHIs tend to be higher than
global ones. This is crucial insofar that the HHIs will be even higher when
calculated for specific local markets since the local market HHI for rail is likely to
be 10,000.

143 Based on McGonigal, 1996.
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The immense deviation from existing antitrust guidelines in favor of
concentration can be traced to the general antitrust attitude during the Reagan
administration. No administration before Reagan had enforced antitrust
regulations in such a pro-merger way. The Reagan administration allowed
mergers the guidelines would appear to prohibit.145 Figure 13 on page 74 and
Figure 14 on page 75 reveal that in these years the number and the total value
of business combinations have been extraordinarily high. Eisner holds that the
policy change in antitrust enforcement in the 1980s was less a product of
presidential or congressional politics than a product of changes within the
bureaucracy initiated well before the 1980 elections.146 This is credible insofar as
much of the deregulation movement in the transportation industry was initiated
by the Carter administration, and took place before 1982 (see Table II on page
39).

The trend towards more liberal antitrust policy in the 1980s also is
reflected in the merger guidelines. The 1982 guidelines provided a more liberal
approach to merger enforcement than the 1968 guidelines, and the 1984, and
1992 amendments continue this liberalizing trend. More specifically, when
compared to the 1968 guidelines, the 1982, 1984 and 1992 guidelines set forth a

144 Data based on data in Figure 12 on page 65. HHIR is based on annual revenue, where HHIRA
includes Amtrak. HHIT is based on annual revenue ton miles.
145 Coate, 1994, p. 61.
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much higher threshold for identifying concentrated markets, give less
significance to concentration analysis, and give more weight to an analysis of
other factors, such as entry and efficiencies.147

Number of combinations, 1955-1989
1200

1000

-r-

□ Vertical

□

□ Unrelated

800

■ Horizontal

600

400

200

Figure 13: Number Of Business Combinations, 1955 - 1989.148

146 Eisner, 1994, p. 75.
147 Tompson, 1996.
148 Blair, 1993, p. 63. Blair classified combinations on the basis of the primary industry codes of
the combining firms (SIC).

75

Value of combinations, in 1995 billion $, 1955-1989
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Figure 14: Value Of Business Combinations, In 1995 Dollar, 1955 - 1989.149

149 Blair, 1993, p. 63. Data adjusted for 1995 $ (by GDP deflator). See also Footnote 148.
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C.

Operations
Generally, the profitability of railroads can be determined by the formula

profitab 'I ty -^ Uant^
revenue Senera^n§ items
quantity o f cost generating items

revenue ton miles
length o f road * train hour * employee '

Recommendations to increase profitability are summarized in Table V on
page 76. These are derived from the general formula for profitability.
Technically, raising rates is also an alternative to increase profitability, but a
highly unpopular one which should not be considered in the presence of other
alternatives.

In the following, it will be examined what changes railroad operation were

load per car

length of road owned

number of cars per train

transit time of trains

length of haul

number of employees

Table V: Determinants Of Railroad Profitability.
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subject to after deregulation and to what extend railroads were able to increase
profitability.

Since 1976 Class I railroads have streamlined their road network
considerably. Miles of road owned have been reduced by almost one half (see
Figure 15 on page 79). These reductions have been realized only in parts
through abandonment. A large part of the track has been sold off to newly
established Short-Line Railroads operating in low traffic density areas. Their
different cost structure makes operations profitable in those areas where
business is unprofitable for Class I railroads. Between 1980 and 1986, 41% of
the mileage divested by Class I railroads was taken over by newly established
short-line railroads.150

By now, short-lines operate about 20% of the industry’s track.151 Between
1980 and 1989, 224 new local or regional railroads have been established.152 In
1996, there were about 60 families of short lines across the country. The largest
short-line operator, RailTex Inc., operates 26 short-line railroads.153 Generally,

150 Rockey, 1987. See also Figure 15 and Figure 8. For history, statistics and analysis of short-line
Railroads see also Due (1984) and Horn (1989) and Wolfe (1989).
151 See Figure 8 on page 58 and Figure 9 on page 60.
152 Wolfe, 1989, p. 13.
153 DiBennedetto, 1996. See also Figure 8.
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short-lines and line-haul railroads form a hub-and-spoke s yste m '5* That is,
short-lines originate at line-haul terminals and spread across the surrounding
area, providing rail connection to the hinterland and consolidating freight for linehaul railroads. This way, short-lines provide one third of the business for Class I
railroads.155

Between 1976 and 1982, Class I railroads made considerable investments
in (remaining) way and structures (see.Figure 16 on page 80).

The number of accidents decreased significantly (see Figure 17 on page
81) which indicates higher quality of transportation by railroad.

The average length of haul has distinctly increased since deregulation
(Figure 18 on page 82).
The increase can be explained by the concentration of Class I railroads,
especially the large number of end-to-end mergers which facilitate longer,
uninterrupted hauls.156

154 See Figure 29 on page 104.
155 Lafferty, 1996.
156 For an econometric analysis of types of mergers, see Harris, 1983; and Levin, 1979. End-toend mergers in contrast to parallel mergers (also denoted side-by-side mergers) are found to
increase market share and quality of service, but not necessarily to reduce costs. See also
Footnote 85 on page 44. Different from Friedlaender’s assumptions, end-to-end merger have
proven to be the preferable type of merger. This is comprehensible insofar that parallel mergers,
to achieve reduction of excess capacity, imply substantial abandonment which might not be
feasible in practice. Hence, parallel mergers rather create excess capacity than reducing it. On
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Railroad Industry: Miles of Line Haul
250,000
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Figure 15: Industry Miles O f Line-Haul, 1940-1995.157

the other hand, end-to-end merger extend the railroad’s sphere of influence and its territory and
yields more efficient and less costlier operations (through reduction of interchanges). These
effects m
ay offset drawbacks from additional capacity.
157 Association of American Railroads, PL&E Department, 1997. For explanation see
Weight/Distance on page 55.

80

Class I Railroads: Expenditures for Way and Structures,
in million 1995 Dollars, 1940 -1995
14000

12000
10000
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Figure 16: Class I Railroads: Expenditures For Way And Structures, In 1995 Dollars, 1940 1995.158

158 Moody, 1995, p. a20. GDP deflator. See United States Government Printing Office, 1997.
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Accidents per million train-miles
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Figure 17: Number Of Rail Accidents Per Million Train-Miles,159 1980-1995.160

159 For explanation, see Weight/Distance on page 55.
160 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 63. No separate data is available for derailments in the years 19811984. Data coverall railroads.
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C lass I R ailroads: A verage length o f haul (m iles)

900
800
700
600
to

0) 500
E 400
300

200

100
O
o>

CO

o>

C
O

M-

C
D

o>
o>

»
o lO
lO
L
O
C
D
C
D
C
D
C
M

CO

C
D
C
D

r^co

C
D

o

hC
D

CO

r-

C
D

C
O

r-

C
D

C
D

r-

C
D

C
M
CO

C
D

lO

CO

C
D

IIII
o>
GO
GO

M-

C
D
C
D

Figure 18: Class I Railroads: Average Length Of Haul, 1940 - 1995.161

Moreover, the longer the haul, the larger is the competitive advantage of
the railroad over the truck. The break-even distance where railroad service
becomes more profitable than truck service is about 500-700 miles.162 End-toend mergers enabled the railroads to further extend their advantage in hauling
heavy load over long distances.

161 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 36.
162 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 23. See also The Economics of
Intermodal Transportation on page 102.

83

Figure 19 on page 83 indicates that total freight revenue tons originated
by Class I railroads have declined after deregulation (only revenue tons of coal
i

and chemicals and plastics have increased).163

all other goods

Coal, Chemicals

1200

700

600
1000
n i i i others

500
800

i— i T ransportation
Equipment
i— i Pulp & Paper
r— i Scrap materials

400

m

Petroleum

m

Stone, Clay & glass
products
H i Primary Metal

600

Metallic Ores
300

i— i Metallic Ores
r — i Lumber & Wood

Lumber & Wood

i— i Food Products

400

Food Products

200

Farm Products
Nonmetallic Minerals
Coal

200

Farm Products

100

Chemicals & Plastics

Nonmetallic
Minerals
i( 0n i N
O ) T - r t i f i S f f i ' - n t n N ® r n i n
0 i 0 r - r ^ - | s - N - r > . c o c o c o c o c o o > 0 ) O >

0>0)0)0)0)0)0)0)(n0>(^0)0)0)0)0)

Figure 19: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Tons Originated, With Respect To Goods Carried,
In Million Tons, 1965 - 1995.164

1S3 The considerable increase in revenue ton-miles of coal can be attributed to the discovery of the
large deposits of low-sulfur coal in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming in the 1970s.
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This implies, assuming costs of input factors have kept constant, that
expenditures for loading and unloading of trains have also decreased. In
comparison, the number of revenue ton miles - the basis for freight revenue - has
increased (Figure 20 on page 84).

Class I Railroads: Revenue ton miles, revenue ton miles per average length of haul, freight
revenue, and freight revenue per revenue ton mile, 1940 -1995
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Figure 20: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Ton Miles, Revenue Ton Miles Per Average Length
O f Haul, Total Freight Revenue, And Freight Revenue Per Ton-Mile, 1940 - 1995.165

164 Moody, 1996, pp. a10-a12. "others” consist of machinery, electrical equipment, fabricated
metal products, and freight forwarder traffic.
165 Freight revenue ton-miles: Moody, 1996, p. a5, or Moody, 1996, p. a2, and Railroad Facts,
1996, p. 27 (not all years); revenue ton miles per average length of haul: (calculated); total freight
revenue: Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 13, missing data are calculated (freight revenue ton miles times
freight revenue per ton mile), calculations match data where available; freight revenue per ton
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Since the number of tons originated has actually decreased, the increase
in revenue ton miles must be caused by an increase in the average length of
haul (Figure 18 on page 82). This is confirmed by the quotient of revenue ton
miles and average length of haul which is constant over the years (Figure 20 on
page 84).166

Average revenue tons per train load have increased (Figure 21 on page
86) where average tons per carload have not changed.167 That is, trains have
become longer (more cars per train). This is in opposition to improved service
since it implies a reduced train frequency.

mile: Moody, 1996, p. a5 and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 30. Financial data are adjusted for 1995
Dollars (by GDP deflator).
166 “Revenue ton miles per average length of haul” do not necessarily have to be equal to
“revenue tons originated” because the data for “average length of haul” is not as accurate as data
for “revenue ton miles” since it is not weighted by tons carried per haul (train). That is, a train
consisting of 10 cars contributes as much to “average length of haul” as a train consisting of 100
cars hauled over the same distance does. On the other hand, “revenue ton miles” accurately
reflect tons hauled over distance).
167 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 37.
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Class I Railroads: Average revenue tons per train load,
in tons, 1940 - 1995
3000 -r-
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Figure 21: Class I Railroads: Average Revenue Tons Per Train Load, 1940 - 1995.168

The number of employees and hence total annual compensation have
been reduced by 25% between 1980 and 1982 and by another 25% since 1982
(Figure 22 on page 87). The drop in the number of employees was mainly due
to reduction in crew sizes.169 However, compensation per employee has
increased. This was due to an increased share of higher qualified employees.

168 Moody, 1996, p. a2, and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 37 (not all years).
169 Keaton, 1991. See also MacDonald, 1996.
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Class I Railroads: Number of employees, total compensation,
and compensation per employee, 1940 -1995
60,000 _

e|

1600
1400

50,000

«<>
cO
)

E&

1200

«-

1000

®

40,000

30,000

(0 Ol

2 .s2
Ii »
g
®

u 0>

1c Io
cO
■«
§o =
c

- 600

-g

20,000

- 400

-6—total annual compensation
■m— annual compensation per employee

10,000

200

— average number of employees

o

co

o>

CM
IT )

CO
IT )

CO

co

o

r*-

CO

O)

m
e
o
oo
c
o

O)

Figure 22: Class I Railroads: Number Of Employees, Total Compensation, And Compensation
Per Employee, 1940 - 1995.170

170 Total annual compensation: Moody, 1996, p. a21, or Moody, 1996, p. a25, and Railroad Facts,
1996, p. 55 (not all years); annual average number of employees: Moody, 1996, p. a25, and
Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 55 (not all years); annual compensation per employee: Calculated (total
annual compensation divided by average number of employees); Financial data are adjusted for
1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Class I Railroads: Ton miles per train hour, train miles per train hour, labor expenses per ton
mile, ton miles per mile of road owned, ton miles per employee, 1940 -1995
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Figure 23: Class I Railroads: Net Ton Miles171 Per Train Hour, Train Miles Per Train Hour, Labor
Expenses Per Revenue Ton Mile, Revenue Ton Miles Per Mile Of Road Owned (Traffic Density),
Revenue Ton Miles Per Employee, 1940 - 1995.172

171 A net ton mile is equal to a revenue ton mile including exclusive work equipment and motorcar
trains. In 1995, Class I railroads carried 1,305,688 million revenue ton miles and 1,315,381 million
net ton miles. (Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 38) Therefore, for the purpose of this study, both numbers
can be treated to be equal.
172 Net ton miles per train hour. Moody, 1996, p. a22, and Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 38 (not all
years). Figures for 1980 and beyond are not directly comparable to earlier years because of an
STB definitional change requiring the inclusion of terminal delay in counting train hours. That is, in
terms of the former definition of revenue ton miles per train hour, figures for 1980 and beyond are
actually higher. Train miles per train hour. Calculated (revenue ton miles per train hour divided by
average revenue tons per train load). Labor expenses per revenue ton mile: calculated; revenue
ton miles per mile of road owned: (calculated); revenue ton miles per employee: (calculated).
Financial data are adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Figure 20 on page 84 indicates that total freight revenue and freight
revenue per ton-mile has decreased significantly since deregulation. Although
freight revenue per ton mile is not an exact surrogate for freight rates because it
is affected by changes in traffic composition and length of haul, it does record
the level of revenue received by railroads for providing the basic transportation
service, which is hauling of weight over distance.173 However, the increase in
ton-miles after deregulation can be attributed to an increase in the average
length of haul. The number of tons originated has declined, as has total real
freight revenue. Real freight revenue per ton originated has increased since
deregulation (Figure 24 on page 90). Marginal costs of hauling freight over an
extra mile are low compared to costs of loading and unloading. Thus, the
increase in length of haul allowed railroads charge more per haul at nearly
unchanged costs.

173 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 30.
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Class I Railroads: Freight revenue per revenue ton
originated in thousand 1995$, 1965 - 1995
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Figure 24: Class I Railroads: Freight Revenue Per Revenue Ton Originated In Thousand 1995
Dollar, 1 9 6 5 - 1995.174

Operational efficiency increases of Class I railroads are depicted in Figure
23 on page 88. It shows that revenue ton miles per train hour (speed), per mile
of road owned (traffic density), and per employee (productivity) have increased
significantly since deregulation. However, the actual speed of trains has not
been increased. The increase in revenue ton miles per train hour is a sole result
of longer trains. Figure 25 on page 91 summarizes the operational efficiency
increases of Class I railroads. Operational efficiency has increased nominally by
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almost 600% since 1980. Taking into account that real compensation per
employee has increased and revenue per ton mile has decreased yields a real
operational efficiency increase of 350% since 1980.

Class I RR:
revenue ton miles per train hour per
mile of road owned per employee
(tons/#_of_t rains/hour/em ployee);
standardized for 1980
Class I RR:
annual freight revenue per train hour
per mile of road owned per annual
labor expenses (1995$) (1/#_of_
trains/hour/mile); standardized for
1980

o>

Figure 25: Class I Railroads: Revenue Ton Miles Per Train Hour Per Mile Of Road Owned Per
Employee, Annual Freight Revenue Per Train Hour Per Mile Of Road Owned Per Annual Labor
Expenses, 1940 -1 9 9 5 . Standardized For 1980.175

174 Data calculated by dividing total freight revenue (Moody, 1996, p. a. 12) by total revenue tons
originated (Moody, 1996, p. a. 12). Revenue is adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
175 Revenue ton miles per train hour. See Footnote 172; miles of road owned: See Footnote 157;
number of employees: See Footnote 170; annual freight revenue: See Footnote 165; annual labor
expenses: See Footnote 170. Financial data are adjusted for 1995 Dollars (by GDP deflator).
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Recall Figure 6 on page 42 which shows that the railroads increased their
share of total intercity freight traffic since 1980. Also recall Figure 7 on page 45
which shows the rate of return of Class I railroads has increased significantly
since deregulation.

D.

Contract Rates
There are about 90,000 contracts in force in early 1990, affecting 60% of

total rail traffic, 86% of coal tonnage, 63% of grain volume, and 54% of *
chemicals traffic.176 In 1996, almost 70% of all rail traffic moved under
contracts.177 Railroad contract filing requirements were eliminated except for
contracts for movement of agricultural commodities in 1997.178

E.

Deregulation of the Trucking Industry
The emergence of the trucking industry has been regarded as a major

factor of the poor performance of the railroad industry, which ultimately led to
railroad deregulation. In 1980, the year the railroad industry was deregulated,
also the trucking industry was deregulated. In this section, the major aspects of

176 Wilner, 1990.
177 Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 6.
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the deregulation of the trucking industry are highlighted. The section starts with
an introduction of industry specific classifications.

1.

Classifications of Trucking Firms

Statistical information in the trucking industry has some caveats due to
complex classification systems of carriers that are often mixed up.

a.

Standard Industry Classification

The motor freight transportation and warehousing industry groups are
classified into nine industries. Among those the most important are Local
Trucking without Storage (SIC 4212), Local Trucking with Storage (SIC
4214), Trucking, except Local (SIC 4213) (also denoted intercity-, interstate-,
or Jong-distance-carriers).179

b.

Classification by Type o f Contract

A common carrier is any carrier engaged in the interstate transportation
of persons/property on a regular schedule at published rates, and whose

178 Welty, 1997.
179 Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, 1987.
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services are available to the general public on a for-hire basis.180 A contract
carrier is any carrier engaged in the interstate transportation of persons/property
by motor vehicle on a for-hire basis, but under continuing contract with a limited
number of customers to meet specific needs of each customer.181 A private
carrier is any carrier that provides transportation service to the firm that owns or
leases the vehicle and does not charge a fee.182

c.

Classification by Commodity Carried

The ICC had divided the intercity trucking industry (SIC 4213) into
seventeen commodity divisions, including general freight183 (50.0% of all
carriers), tank truck (9.4%), bulk commodities (7.8%), refrigerated commodities
(6.6%), household goods (6.0%), motor vehicles (1.7%), and other specialized
commodities or other commodities not elsewhere classified (18.5%).184

d.

Classification by Shipment Size

Intercity earners o f general freight are further classified either into LTL
(less-than-truckload) carriers or TL (truckload) carriers. TL carriers transport

180 Muller, 1995, p. 255.
181 Muller, 1995, p. 256.
182 Muller, 1995, p. 267.
183 nonbulk.
184 American Trucking Associations, 1993.
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shipments not less than a truckload (10,000 pounds) while LTL carriers transport
shipments of less than a truckload.185 In 1993, 40.2% of all ICC-regulated
intercity carriers of general freight were TL carriers and 9.8% were LTL
carriers.186

e.

Classification by Annual Gross Revenue

The ICC has classified motor carriers by their annual gross revenue into
Class I, Class II, and Class III carriers.187

2.

The M otor C arrier A c t o f 1980

In the same year the Staggers Act deregulated the railroads also the
trucking industry was deregulated through the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.
The main provisions of the Motor Carrier Act were:188

■ Entry into the trucking industry was encouraged by placing the “burden of
p ro o f on existing carriers that additional service was not needed.
■ Removal of operational restrictions former entrants had submitted to voluntary
in order to overcome opposition on part of incumbents (like types of goods not
carried, routes and interchanges not used, etc.).
185 U.S. Census Bureau, 1995, p. B-3.
186 American Trucking Associations, 1993.
187 Muller, 1995, p. 254. In 1995, the Class I threshold was $10 million, Class II threshold was $3 $10 million, and Class III threshold was below $3 million.
188 Wood, 1990, p. 100.
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■ Removal of restrictions on the number of customers with whom each contract
motor carrier can contract.
■ A “zone of reasonableness” was introduced into motor common carrier rates.
A carrier may charge rates within a range of plus minus 10 percent a year
without regulatory approval.
■ The influence of common carrier rate bureaus was reduced.
■ Use of trucks by domestic airlines to pick up or deliver freight that is carried by
air was facilitated.

Among these provisions freedom of entry was the most important factor.
Its effects were obvious immediately after deregulation of the motor carrier
industry. In 1980, there were 18,000 motor carriers holding ICC licenses
(intercity carriers), in 1986, there were 37.000189, and in 1992 there were
49,000.190 The total number of carriers is even higher. In 1997, the number of
trucking establishments totaled 122,190.191

189 Winston, 1990, p. 11.
190 Teske, 1995, p. 71.
191 Dun & Bradstreet, 1997, p. 15. The number is the summation of 67,669 establishments in
Local Trucking without Storage (SIC 4212), 8,177 establishments in Local Trucking with Storage
(SIC 4214), and 46,314 establishments in Trucking, except Local (SIC 4213). In 1992, the
numbers were as follows: Local Trucking without Storage: 49,870; Trucking, except Local:
40,821; Local Trucking with Storage: 4,512. Total was 95,203 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996, Table
No. 1024, p. 635). in 1977, the total number of establishments was 58,335 (U.S. Census Bureau,
1982, Table No. 1084, p. 624).
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3.

Economics of Size and Concentration in the Trucking Industry

The increase in entry into the trucking industry after deregulation suggests
that there are no economics of size in the trucking industry. Classical barriers to
entry appear to be absent: Capital requirements are low, and investment
involves no sunk costs. Hence, the trucking industry appears to be potentially
atomistic and approaching perfect competition. This is partly true for the truck
load (TL) sector. Both legal and economic barriers into the truck-load (TL) sector
are relatively low. The large number of TL businesses operated as sole
proprietorship supports this assumption.192 However, a large number of trucks
and scheduled routes bring about an enhanced backhaul ability, and a large
number of drivers stationed across the nation and sophisticated computer
systems bring about shorter transit time. Therefore, there are potential
economics of size in the TL sector, which however do not constitute barriers to
entry. The less-than-truck-load (LTL) sector is quite different. To offer
comprehensive nationwide LTL service, a network of at least 300 terminals is
needed in order to provide competitive service.193 LTL carriers collect, sort,
consolidate, transport, and distribute shipments through a network of terminals
organized on the hub- and-spoke principle. The LTL business process requires
different equipment for each stage. Hence, in the LTL business there are distinct

192 Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 25.
193 Glaskowsky, 1986, p. 5.
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economics of size that prevent entry although legal barriers of entry had been
removed by deregulation. Since deregulation, virtually no new carriers have
entered the LTL freight industry and survived.194

Figure 26 on page 99 depicts the concentration of the top two hundred
motor carriers in 1995, split up into TL and LTL sectors. It can be seen that 6
LTL carriers account for 50% of the revenues of the top 55 LTL carriers and that
16 TL carriers account for 50% of the revenues of the 74 top TL carriers.
Although no data are available on each individual firm in the interstate
trucking industry, the allover relation of number of establishments and total
revenue indicates the dimension of concentration: There are about 120,000
firms195 in the industry with total revenue of about $90 billion.196 The 129 firms
graphed in Figure-26 on page 99 account for $30 billion of revenue out of the
industry total of $90 billion. The large number of small firms suggests that
barriers to entry into the are trucking industry (at least TL) are low. Nevertheless,
the industry is dominated by large firms.

194 Interstate Commerce Commission, 1992, pp. 36-40.
195 See Footnote 191 on page 96.
196 U.S. Census Bureau, 1996, p. 636, Table 1027. This number is not broken down into TL, LTL,
and “others”. See Footnote 197 on page 98.
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Figure 26: Top 200 Motor Carriers: Industry Concentration, 1995.197

Figure 27 on page 100 depicts the HHIs of the TL and LTL carriers
graphed in Figure 26 on page 99 . Although below the critical level of 1,000, the
HHI for the LTL sector is more than 10 times higher than the HHI for the TL
sector. Roberts argued that separating carriers by the markets in which they

197 Data from American Trucking Associations, 1995.
various categories these carriers were classified into
into three classes: LTL, package/courier/expediated,
LTL, TL and bulk/tank trailers were consolidated into

The data is based on 1995 revenues. The
by type of goods carried were consolidated
and household goods were consolidated into
TL, and all other were consolidated into
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compete reveals even higher concentration. For example, transcontinental
carriers were defined as carriers with average hauls over 1,000 miles, there were
only six transcontinental LTL carriers giving the market a HHI of 2357.198

1995 Top 200 Motor Carriers: HHI
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Figure 27: Top 200 Motor Carriers: HHI, 1995.1" LTL = less-than-truck-load; TL = truck-load.

others which has been excluded. UPS which is number one and accounts for 26.6% of revenues
of the top 2 0 0 motor carriers has been excluded.
198 Roberts, 1992.
199 See Footnote 197 on page 96.
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In this chapter, the main developments in the railroad industry that have
occurred after deregulation were examined. These are continuing firm
concentration and streamlining of operations. Also the trucking industry and its
development after deregulation were introduced. In chapter V, intermodal
transportation, a form of transportation that has become most significant after
deregulation, is introduced. Secondly, the railroad market is segmented and
particular segments are analyzed for contestability.

102

CHAPTER V.

THE U.S. RAILROAD INDUSTRY IN THE 1990s

A.

Intermodal Transportation
1.

The Economics of Intermodal Transportation

Intermodal freight transport is a logistically linked movement of freight
using two or more modes of transport. The idea of intermodality is to capitalize
on mode specific advantages that are mutually exclusive in single mode
transportation, mostly universal service availability versus low costs perton-m ile.
Potential gains from intermodality are twofold. First, intermodality can provide
shippers who are not immediately served by a low-cost carrier with access to a
low-cost carrier via an intermediate high-cost carrier.200 Second, the low-cost
carrier, usually specialized in uninterrupted long-haul, is able to reduce the
number of stops since freight is consolidated by high-cost carriers. That is, take
advantage of the average length of haul, which is a key determinant of
profitability for railroads (see Figure 20 on page 84).

Although low cost carrier service might be available at the location of a shipper, the shipper
might not meet the minimum volume requirements. Therefore, shipments need to be consolidated
by a high cost carrier.

200
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Depending on the type of freight carried specific combinations of modes
are favorable in practice. Table VI on page 103 depicts three different
combinations. A railroad is a low cost carrier compared to a truck, but a highcost carrier in comparison to a barge. The combination truck-railroad for
container traffic is the most common combination followed by barge-railroad for
non-liquid bulk material. Intermodal railroad-truck service, combines the door-todoor service of trucks with the high-volume, long-haul economies of railroads. In
intermodal railroad-truck service the primary types of equipment involved are
containers or truck trailers which are carried on railroad cars. The combination
truck-railroad-ocean vessel is most common in overseas container traffic.

Containerized commodities

Truck, Railroad, Barge

Solid bulk material/grain

Railroad, Barge

Liquid bulk material

Pipeline, Barge, Railroad

Table VI: Economical Intermodal Combinations O f Carriers, Modes Ranked By Carrier Cost Per
Ton-Mile.

Intermodal transport is organized in accordance with a hub-and spoke
system. Figure 29 on page 104 presents a generic hub-and-spoke topology to
be carried from A 1to A2. A commodity is first carried the distance ABi from A 1
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into hub 1 on a high-cost mode and then transshipped onto the low-cost carrier.
The low-cost carrier moves the commodity over the distance CE from hub 1 into
hub 2, where the commodity is again transshipped to another high-cost carrier
that moves it the distance BA2 into A2.

Ai
ABi

CE

Figure 29: Generic Hub-And-Spoke Topology.

Figure 30 on page 105 shows the corresponding cost structure, which is
the basic cost structure inherent in any hub-and-spoke system. AF represents
the total cost curve of the high-cost carrier (spoke), indicated by a steeper slope
of the cost curve, while CE represents the total cost curve of the low-cost carrier
(inter-hub connection) which is not directly available for the shipper. The
difference Pc - pB represents the cost of transshipment (hub) which equal the
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costs associated with unloading the high-cost carrier and loading the low-cot
carrier. In the context of Figure 30 on page 105, indicated by the dark line
ABCDE, a good is carried the distance dB at cost pB, transshipped at cost pc - pB,
and then carried on the low-cost carrier at cost pE- pc. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the distance dB includes pickup and drayage (dB = AB., + BA2 in
Figure 29 on page 104) and that pc - pB represent the cost of transshipment at
both interchanges. Point D represents the break-even point, and
correspondingly dD is the break-even distance beyond which intermodal traffic
becomes less costly. In practice, the break-even distance between railroad
service and truck service is about 500-700 miles.201

total cost

Pf

Pe
Pd

Pc
Pb

dD

c Ib

total distance of m o v e m e n t

Figure 30: Cost Structure Of Intermodal Transportation.

201

United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 23.
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In the economic analysis of hub-and-spoke systems the transshipment
facility (hub) and the transshipment process are the key objects. Taking the cost
structure of the high-cost and the low-cost carriers involved as given, Figure 30
on page 105 suggests that total costs of the entire movement are solely
dependent on transshipment costs.202 Hence, the objective is to minimize
transshipment costs.

There are two different approaches to minimize transshipment costs.
First, it has been empirically confirmed that hub facilities demonstrate size
economies.203 That is, the larger the hubs are and the lower the number of hubs
is the more costs are saved. Second, it has been found that transaction costs
associated with multiple independent ownership of carriers and hubs are much
higher than the costs of administrative command under uniform ownership.204
Hence, overall costs are minimized by integrating hub facilities and all carriers
involved in the transportation chain under uniform administrative command and
ownership.205

This assumption is not completely accurate because average total costs of haul may be a
function of length of haul. For purpose of this examination, differences are assumed to be inferior
over the relevant range of output.
203 Allen, 1986, pp. 22-23.
204 Allen, 1986, pp. 26-27.
205 For a broad discussion of the transaction cost approach, see Coase, 1991, p. 18.
202
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To conclude, as far as railroads are involved, costs of intermodal
transportation are minimized if:

1. The distance between terminals is rather long.

Freight revenue is based on ton-miles per time. That is, the longer the haul,
the heavier loaded the train (the more cars), and the shorter any delays are,
the more revenue the railroad earns.206 A terminal constitutes a stop which
causes a delay. Moreover, the more terminals there are, the shorter the
average length of haul and the less average train load between terminals.

2. Terminals are large in size.

Terminal operation demonstrates size economics. Therefore, it is more
profitable to operate a few large terminals rather than many small terminals.
This also supports the demand for long hauls in between terminals, and
heavier loaded trains.

3. Terminals and other modes o f transportation involved are operated under
uniform administrative command and ownership.

206

This has been found earlier (see section Operations on page 76).
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It has been found that an intermodal entity under uniform ownership can
provide all services in the transportation chain at lower costs than under
multiple ownership. That is, an entity under uniform ownership providing all
different intermodal services has a strictly subadditive cost function and hence
constitutes a natural monopoly (multiproduct case).207 Consequently,
intermodal transportation is always a natural monopoly. Since railroads are
generally the financially strongest firms involved in intermodal transportation, it
is likely that intermodal entities are put under administrative command and
ownership of railroads. A survey among chief executives of all Class I
railroads in 1981 revealed that more than three-fourths of the survey
respondents indicated that their railroads planned to attempt to expand on an
intermodal ownership basis during the next five years.208 Trucking was most
often identified as the likely direction of such expansion. The most important
benefits offered by further integration of the modes are a broader traffic base
and improved service through provision of one-stop, door-to-door intermodal
service.

2.

207
208

Intermodal Acquisitions

See The Natural Monopoly on page 13.
Lieb, 1982, p. 74.
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In 1983, the ICC removed the ban on acquisition of commercial trucking
firms by railroads.209 During the following years several intermodal acquisitions
took place: In June, 1985, Norfolk Southern Corporation acquired North
American Van Lines and its subsidiaries.210 Today, North American Van Lines is
the twelfth largest motor carrier in the U.S.211 In October, 1996, Union Pacific
Corporation acquired the Overnite Transportation Company.212 Today, Overnite
Transportation Company is the tenth largest motor carrier (LTL) in the U.S.213

In 1983, CSX Corporation acquired American Commercial Barge Lines,
the nation's largest barge line with between 6% and 7% of the inland waterway
transportation market. It was the first time a railroad had been allowed to
purchase a barge line since the Panama Canal Act of 1912 forbade railroads
from owning water carriers.214 In September 1986, CSX Corporation acquired
Sea-Land Service, Inc., one of the nation's largest ocean carriers.215 In 1987,
CSX integrated Sea-Land Service’s trucking subsidiaries into its new intermodal
unit, CSX Intermodal, Inc.216 In 1988, CSX acquired a majority interest in Yukon
Pacific Corp., an Alaska based corporation that is promoting the construction of a

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

New York Times, 01/07/83.
Moody, 1996, p. 76.
American Trucking Associations, p. 2.
Moody, 1996, p. 110.
American Trucking Associations, 1995, p. 1.
Industry Week, 08/06/84.
Moody, 1996, p. 421.
Abruzzese, 1987.
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Trans-Alaska-Gas System to export North Slope natural gas to Pacific Rim
countries.217

In 1987, the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, rescinded the
ICC’s 1983 rule which eased acquisition of trucking firms by railroads. This
litigation sprang from Burlington Northern’s attempt to acquire six trucking
companies at the same time.218 In 1994, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railway (now merged into Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation) reached
an agreement for joint intermodal operations with Yellow Freight System, Inc. (a
LTL carrier), the nation’s second largest motor carrier after UPS (see Footnote
197 on page 98).219 Table VII on page 111 depicts today’s intermodal
subsidiaries of Class I railroads.

Although the ease of national intermodal acquisitions has been stemmed,
it continues internationally. In June 1996, CSX, NS Cargo (the Netherlands’ rail
freight operator), and Germany's Deutsche Bahn (DB) announced that they have
signed a letter of intent to jointly create a company called NDX Intermodal. The
new company will provide freight service for the movement of containers, trailers
and swap body freight throughout Europe.220

217
218
219
220

Moody, 1996, p. 421.
Regular Common Carrier Conference v. U.S., 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
Klaus, 1994.
Hill, 1996.
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Conrail

Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co.

Fixed Facilities and Inspection and

4785

Weighing Services for Motor Vehicle

Norfolk
Lambert's Point Barge Company, Inc. Water Transportation of Freight, nec 4449
Southern
Marine Cargo Handling
4491
Lambert's Point Docks, Inc.
Refined Petroleum Pipelines
4613
Airforce Pipeline Inc.
NS Transportation Brokerage
Arrangement of Transportation of
4731

CSX

Corporation
Southern Region Motor Transport,
Inc.
North American Van Lines, Inc.
American Commercial Lines Inc.
CSX Intermodal, Inc.

Sea-Land Service, Inc.
Yukon Pacific Corp.
Landa Motor Lines

Kansas
City
Southern
UP
PMT of the Southwest, Inc.

Freight and Cargo
Trucking, Except Local

Trucking, Except Local.
4213
Water Transportation of Freight, nec 4449
3731
Ship Building and Repairing
Railroads, Line-Haul Operating
Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of
Freight
Water Transportation of Freight, nec
Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of
Freight
(Pipeline)
Trucking, Except Local

4011
4412

Trucking, Except Local
Transportation Services, nec

4213
4789

Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge
Co.
The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Transportation Services, nec
Co.
Trucking, Except Local
Overnite Transportation Co.
General Warehousing and Storage
Trucking, Except Local
Pacific Motor Transport Co.
Trucking, Except Local
Pacific Motor Trucking Co.
General Warehousing and Storage
Southern Pacific Warehouse Co.

Table VII: Class I Railroads: Intermodal Subsidiaries, 1997.221

221

National Register Publishing Company, 1997.

4213

4449
4412

4213

4789
4213
4225
4213
4213
4225
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3.

The Intermodal Business (Rail-Truck)

Today’s intermodal service has arisen during the last 20 years. Between
1980 and 1995, the number of intermodal units loaded by United States railroads
increased from 3.0 million units to 8.1 million units, or more than 250% (see
Figure 31 on page 1 13).222 Accordingly, intermodal service has become a very
important source of revenue for railroads. In 1994, intermodal traffic generated
approximately 15 percent of total revenues of railroads, making it the second
most important revenue source.223 Generally, only high value commodities (non
bulk) are shipped in intermodal units. This is remarkable insofar as high value
goods traditionally are not shipped by railroad because railroad transportation
traditionally was seen to be less reliable and damage rates were high.

Intermodal units are trailers, ajso denoted TOFC (trailer-on-flatcar) or “piggyback”, and
containers, also denoted C.O.F.C. (container-on-flatcar, known as “double-stack train”).
223 Muller, 1995, p. 29.

222
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Figure 31: Class I Railroads: Intermodal Traffic, 1965 - 1995.224

Despite the rapid growth since 1980, intermodal traffic still accounts for
only a small share of the total intercity freight traffic in the U.S., about 6
percent.225 It is estimated that 25% of the intercity trucking market is susceptible
to competition between intermodal rail service and truckload companies, which is
the share of interstate trucking freight hauled over more than 500 miles.226

224
225
226

Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 26.
Railroad Facts, 1996, p. 26.
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 24.
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Generally, railroads act as wholesalers in selling intermodal service, while
third parties act as retailers and consolidators of small shipments.227 Rail
contracts now offer rate structures that induce container traffic consolidation into
larger trains, denser routes, fewer origin and destination points, and fewer
ports.228

In 1984, container and trailer traffic was exempted from regulation. The
Shipping Act of 1984 introduced greater flexibility in the use of service contracts
for the ocean shipping and intermodal movement of containers. In 1991,
Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act which
aims at developing a nationwide intermodal transportation system. It
encourages intermodal connectivity (i.e., agreements among carriers of different
modes), providing legislative and financial incentives of $155 billion in the fiscal
years 1992-1997.229

Although the intermodal business has been growing, the number of
terminals has been declining. In 1975 there were 1,500 intermodal terminals in
the U.S., compared to 230 in 1990.230 The reduction in the number of terminals
can be explained in two ways. First, it is a direct consequence of the

227 Those are Shippers’ Agents now denoted Intermodal Marketing Companies (IMC), Shippers’
Associations, and Freight Forwarders.
228 MacDonald, 1996.
229 Muller, 1995, p. 27.
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concentration of Class I railroads which made “doubled facilities” obsolete.
Second, the cost structure of railroad operation calls for concentration of
terminals per se. Computerized logistics via EDI have become a core
component of intermodal service, calling for further centralization and
concentration.

B.

Is the Railroad Monopoly Contestable?
In the 19th century, the railroads had been the only means of

transportation. In 1887, a rationale for railroad regulation had been to protect
shippers from abuse of monopoly power of the railroads. In 1980, a rationale for
deregulating the railroads was that the impact of railroads on the surface
transportation system of the U.S. had been dwindling and hence there was no
threat of abuse of monopoly power on part of the railroads any more. The
railroad industry was not said to be competitive, but since there were alternatives
to railroad service in most cases, railroad service was seen to be contestable.23'

Since the deregulation in 1980, the railroad industry has undergone some
significant structural changes. In particular, the railroads have improved their
efficiency by 350%, the concentration of Class I railroads has taken on levels far

230

United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 22.
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above the “critical level”, and railroads have acquired leading firms of different
modes of transportation. Therefore, in this section of the study, it is examined
whether the railroad industry can said to be contestable today.

1.

Defining The Relevant Market

The degree of market power, competition, and contestability can only be
measured for a relevant market. That is, the entire market needs to be
segmented by (1) product and by (2) geographic area for further examinations.

a.

Product

In the railroad industry “product” means movement of a particular
commodity. Figure 19 on page 83 depicts all major types of commodities carried
by railroads. For the following examinations those are consolidated into four
major groups (see Table VIII on page 118). Those are “intermodal” (index “I”),
“liquid bulk material” (index “L”), “solid bulk material” (index “S”), and “farm
products” (index “F”), where each of them constitutes a separate product market.
Each product market p is assigned a “degree of potential contestability” Cp
based on consideration by which modes each commodity group can be shipped
economically. “Economical” in this context means that the rate for transportation

231

See The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 on page 48.
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of a unit of a particular commodity by a certain mode does not exceed a
prohibitive threshold which would disallow transportation of that particular
commodity by that mode in practice. However, even though there may be
several economical modes of transportation for each particular commodity, there
may be considerable rate differentials among these modes. The more
competitive in their primary markets the modes of transportation being
economical for a particular commodity are, and the more alternative modes of
transportation are economical for a particular commodity, the more potentially
contestable that particular product market is.

118

Containerized
goods
(intermodal)

(C, = 4)

Liquid bulk
material (“oil”)
CL = 3
Solid bulk
material
Cs = 2
Farm products
(“grain”)

CF = 1

Containers can be economically shipped by barge, railroad,
and truck (TL). Although trucking is the least economical
mode of transportation, trucking is most economical for
containerized goods (high-value goods). The TL industry is
competitive because entry is free (i.e., it is most likely that
every shipper has the opportunity to ship containers by truck
alternatively to railroad or barge) and trucks are not locally
bound.232
Liquid bulk materials can be economically shipped by
pipeline, barge, and railroad. There are two alternatives if
one mode drops out. However, all three alternatives are
locally bound and hence possibly not actually available at any
particular location.
Solid bulk materials can be economically shipped by barge,
and railroad. There is only one alternative if one mode drops
out. However, both alternatives are locally bound and hence
possibly not actually available at any particular location.
Farm products can be economically shipped by barge, and
railroad. There is only one alternative if one mode drops out.
However, both alternatives are locally bound and hence
possibly not actually available at any particular location.
Further, shipper’s bargaining power is rather low (there is a
large number of small shippers) and the business is seasonal
which may cause reluctance on part of carriers to make
commitments in equipment and other capacity.

Table VIII: Commodities (Product Markets) Ranked By And Their Degree Of Potential
Contestability C p .233

232
233

See Economics of Size and Concentration in the Trucking Industry on page 97.
“4 ” = most contestable. See also Table VI on page 103.
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For formal purposes, the entries in Table VIII on page 118 can be
rewritten as matrix E (matrix of economical modes of transportation in particular
product markets), where an entry Epm= 1 indicates that mode m is an
economical mode of transportation in product market p and Epm= 0 indicates that
mode m is not an economical mode of transportation in product market p.
Modes of transportation are indexed R = “railroad”, M = “motor carrier”, B =
“barge”, P = “pipeline”.
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'

*
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1 0 1 0
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1 0

Vector C contains the degree of potential contestability Cp of each
product market p,
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b.

Geographic Area

Table IX on page 120 shows the relative density of transportation modes
in selected regions Rg of the United States.

(1) East of Missouri River

2

3

1

2

(2) West of Missouri River

1

1

0

1

(3) Official Territory

3

4

3

3

(4) Gulf Coast

3

2

2

4

(5) Ohio River region

4

4

3

4

Table IX: United States: Relative density of transportation modes Agm234

Table IX on page 120 accounts for the relative (with respect to other
geographic regions) density of transportation modes and hence for the general
availability of modes of transportation in particular regions. It does not account
for ownership diversity. That is, although a particular region may exhibit a high
density of a particular mode, competition in that mode does not need to be high
accordingly.

_ dense; “3" = medium; "2" = sparse; “1” = fairly sparse, “0” = none. Railroad: See Table IV
on page 72; Highway. Wood, 1990, p. 95; Waterway Wood, 1990, p. 182; Oil Pipeline: Wood,
1990, p. 151.
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For formal purposes, the entries information in Table IX on page 120 can
be rewritten as matrix A (matrix of availability of modes of transportation m in
geographic markets g), where an entry Agmindicates to what relative extend
mode m is available in a geographic market g

"2
L1R
l5R

Asp _

=

3 4

1

3 3

3 2 2 4
4

2.

1 2

1 1 0

A]p
I

A=

3

4

3 4

The Relevant Markets

To determine the degree of potential contestability of each product market
in each geographic region, the cumulated availability of all modes for each
commodity group in each geographic region is determinated and then multiplied
by the degree of potential contestability of each product market.

Matrix C contains the degree of potential contestability of each product
market in each geographic region.
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Cp x ^ , ( E rm x A lm)
m

Cl XX(£lmxAlm)
m

C=
Cf X

24

15

6

3

8

6

2

1

which yields C = 40

21

12

6

28

21

10

5

44

33

14 7

XA5m)

The entries of matrix C are reproduced in Table X on page 123. The
numbers given in Table X on page 123 are not cardinal, do not reflect cost
differentials among modes, and do not reflect ownership diversity. Nevertheless,
Table X on page 123 indicates to what (relative) extend different physical means
for economical transportation for particular commodity groups (product markets)
are available in particular regions of the U.S. (geographic markets), which is
proportional to the degree of potential contestability of certain (product and
geographic) transportation markets. Accordingly, intermodal transportation in the
Ohio River region appears to be most potentially contestable, while shipping
farm products West of the Missouri River seems to be least contestable.
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East of Missouri River

24

15

6

3

West of Missouri River

8

6

2

1

Official Territory

40

21

12

6

Gulf Coast

28

21

10

5

Ohio River region

44

33

14

7

Table X: Degree O f Potential Contestability In Particular Transportation Markets.235 The extremum
values are bolded.

However, Table X on page 123 does not account for shipments in
between markets. This fact is of particular importance insofar as the break even
distance beyond which railroad service becomes an economical alternative in
intermodal transportation is at 500 miles or more.236 That is, to really capitalize
on the potentially contestable environment in the Ohio River region, commodities
must be shipped over at least 500 miles. A circle with a radius of 500 miles

235 The numbers in Table VIII and Table IX are ordinal, so they do not bear any weight with
respect to each other and hence cannot be a base for the cardinal numbers in Table X. Adding up
relative mode availability of particular transportation modes economical for transportation of
particular commodity groups implies a linear relation which may not reflect reality. The
multiplicative correlation of the cumulated mode availability of particular transportation modes
economical for transportation of particular commodity groups and the degree of potential
contestability of particular product markets may also not reflect reality. However, since the only
purpose of Table X is to identify minimum and maximum, the calculation method applied is
sufficiently accurate.
236 The break even distance for truck-barge and rail-barge is even longer considering the fact that
barge transportation is a low cost mode compared to railroad transportation.
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around the Ohio River region intersects Minneapolis, Kansas City, Arkansas,
Alabama, and the North Atlantic Coast.

Table XI on page 124 indicates that barge service alternative to railroad
service exists only to three of the five destinations, namely the North Atlantic
Coast, the Gulf Coast, and to Minneapolis/St. Paul. However, the upper
Mississippi River System is closed to barge traffic during the winter months.
Thus, Minneapolis/St. Paul does not have barge service over one-third of the
year.237

North A tla n tic C oast

3 Railroads (Conrail, CSX, NFS), Barge

Gulf Coast

1 Railroad (IC), Barge

Minneapolis/St. Paul

1 Railroad (Soo), Barge

Southeast

2 Railroads (CSX, NFS)

West of Missouri River

2 Railroads (via interchange)

Table XI: Available Modes For Freight Transport (Other Than Truck) Out Of The Ohio River
Region Into Destinations More Than 500 Miles Away.

237 Kocemba, 1995.
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The North Atlantic Coast and the Ohio River region are linked through
three Class I railroads, an inland waterway, and a dense interstate highway
network. Hence, intermodal transportation between these two regions appears
to be most contestable.

As shown in Table X on page 123, transportation of farm products out of
the Region West of the Missouri River appears to be least contestable. The
most remote region west of the Missouri River that is exporting farm products at
large scale, is the State of North Dakota. Therefore, for the following
examinations, the study will concentrate on North Dakota as potentially least
contestable region of the U.S. If this market, which is least likely to be
contestable, is still sufficiently contestable, then deregulation is clearly justifies in
all markets.

3.

The Local Market

The central statement of the contestable market theory is that the threat of
potential entry makes a monopolist behave like a firm under perfect competition,
hence, to set its price equal to average total cost. Otherwise, a potential
competitor would enter the market and serve the incumbent’s demand. If the
incumbent matches the price, the entrant would withdraw by fully recovering his
outlays.
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Figure 32 on page 127 illustrates a typical local scenario. Terminal A of
Railroad A (charging rate rA for the movement of a container over a distance x) is
located in the immediate environs of shipper S’ location. In the broader environs
there are Terminal B of Barge Line B and Terminal C of a competing Railroad C
(charging rate rc for the movement of a container over the same distance x).
ATC a are assumed to equal ATCc while rA > rc. Trucking service is available
everywhere where CT{y} is the uniform linear rate charged by the trucking
service for moving a container over the distance y.
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Barge B

Railroad C

Railroad A

road

Figure 32: Contestability At The Local Level.

To ship a container on Railroad A (or to receive the container from A), the
container must be trucked over the distance SaA at costs CT {SaA}. To ship the
same container on Railroad C (or to receive the container from C), the container
must be trucked over the distance SadeC at costs CT{SadeC}, where
CT{SadeC} > CT{SaA}. As long as [rA + CT{SaA}] < [rc + CT{SadeC}], it is still
more profitable for S to ship on Railroad A although rA > rc. Although Railroad A
is making excess profit ([rA - ATCa] > [rc - ATCc]), Railroad C would not move its
Terminal C closer to S because this would involve transaction costs and Railroad
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C would also forgo revenues from other shippers incurring higher trucking costs
after the shift. Just as much, Railroad C would not erect a second terminal close
to S because of operating costs involved that would exceed marginal profits from
S. Principally, railroads are even inclined to reduce the number of terminals.238
Railroad C might lower its rate rc to attract S, but then Railroad A would respond
with a rate cut and both railroads would end up sacrificing profits (predatory
pricing).

The same principle applies for shipments on Barge Line B. Also, as
depicted in Figure 32 on page 127, Barge Line B cannot interchange containers
with Railroad A at all, and vice versa. By locating terminals distant from
waterways, railroads avoid to interchange traffic with barge lines. This enables
the railroad to provide the entire haul on its own, which generates more ton-miles
at constant loading/unloading costs. Railroads have been accused pursuing this
strategy.239

If the local market depicted in Figure 32 on page 127 was perfectly
contestable, then Railroad C or any other entrepreneur would immediately erect
a terminal at point c (as Barge Line B would do at point b), set rc slightly below
rA, serve S, and earn excess profit of rc - ATCc. Railroad A would not

238 See The Intermodal Business (Rail-Truck) on page 112.
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immediately react by matching or undercutting rc (Bertrand-Nash-Conjecture).
However, it has been shown that all this is not going to happen. Consequently, a
market with properties like that depicted in Figure 32 on page 127 is not perfectly
contestable.

On the other hand, the market is not purely monopolistic. Since a
container can be physically shipped on a truck, the availability of trucking service
keeps the railroad rate difference ArAC = (rA - rc) within certain boundaries (Ar < CT
{SadeC} - CT{SaA}). Hence, trucking service is to some extent a substitute for
rail service because its availability influences rail rates. However, it is not a
perfect substitute because the cost of shipping a container by truck exceeds cost
of shipping a container by rail and therefore allow for the rail rate difference ArAC
to be sustainable. Hence, the rate differential o f two modes 5rHL = (rH- rL) is a
measure of their economical substitutability which is proportional to the
contestability of their common market, provided physical substitutability is
feasible. The degree of contestability can be expressed by the coefficient240

C

239 Muller, 1995, p. 35.

=
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where rH is the rate of the high-cost carrier (short-haul) which is
competitive in its primary market and rLis the rate of the low-cost (long-haul)
carrier exhibiting monopolistic behavior. Perfect contestability would be
achieved where C = 1 while C = 0 would constitute a case of a pure monopoly. In
contrast, the sustainable rate difference among monopolistic carriers ArAC is
solely a function of a difference in the costs of the short-hauls, which is a function
of in the distances shipper-terminal at a given high-cost carrier rate
CT{y}- *n

context of Figure 32 on page 127, sustainable rate difference

among monopolistic carriers is241

240 Substitutability of products, which a proportional to contestability in this case, can also
measured by their cross-price-elasticity.
241 The preceding assumption is somewhat simplistic since the shipper assumes both long-haul
rates, rA and rC) to be based on the same long-haul distance x, which is realistic when approached
from the non-contestable edge because in the non-contestable case the long-haul rate per tonmile is per definition lower than the short-haul rate perton-mile (Equation 1). That is, differences
in the long-haul length among both long-haul carriers cause only negligible differences in the total
long-haul charge. Starting the train of thought from the edge of perfect contestability (C = 1
r
{x} = CT {y}) requires to be more specific: Assume the shortest distance between shipper and final
destination (as he crow flies, approximated by road distance) is z which can be broken down into
a distance shipper-terminal (y) and a long-haul (x),
where z < y + x. With [Equation (1)] rA{x} can be rewritten as

C * C T {xA} , where

xA is the long-

haul distance Railroad A uses as basis for the long-haul rate. The shipper perceives no difference
between alternatives A and C if the total costs he will incur are equal:

C * C T* x A + CT* y A =
<=>

CT* ( C * x A + y A)

=

C * C T* x c + CT* y c

(a)

CT* ( C * x c + y c)

(b)

where C j is a rate equal to average total cost set under perfect competition (remember: It was
assumed that the short-haul carrier is perfectly competitive in its primary market and that
contestability means perfect economical substitutability of the modes, which means that the
conditions of the short-haul carrier’s market [perfect competition] become the conditions of the
common market). C is set by external conditions that govern the rate differential of two modes 5rHL
= (rH - rL) of the two modes [Equation (1)]. According to [Equation (b)], in the perfect contestable
case that combination of segments of haul [(i) Railroad A + short haul yA, or (ii) Railroad C + short
haul yc, or (iii) the entire haul (z) by truck] with the shortest total length is the most favorable one,
which is truck. The less contestable the market is, the more favorable that combination that has
the largest portion of the total haul hauled by the long-haul mode (rail) becomes (i.e., the lower
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^ rAC — rA ■ rC

CT{yC} ■

(2)

That is, in determining the terms at which intermodal service is available to
shippers, the location of transshipment facilities is extremely important because
the terms of intermodal service heavily depend on the distances between the
customer and the transshipment facilities. As the distance increases, the transit
time and hence the cost of intermodal service increases because more high-cost
carrier service is taken up, which increases the rates competing long-haul
providers may charge without loosing business.

Generally, the findings suggest that the concept of perfect contestability
does not hold in a local multi-mode transportation market. In terms of [Equation
(1)], perfect contestability among modes means equal rates per unit of
production. Equal rates generally imply equal costs, which in the case of rail and
truck is most unlikely to be correct. From that point, there can never be any
perfect contestability among railroad and truck. The ratio cost covering rail rate

rates the railroad could theoretically charge. However, if there is a gap between the rate a railroad
could theoretically charge and the second lowest bid, the railroad may fill that gap through excess
profit) This finding is immediately comprehensible and is consistent with the finding from the non
contestable edge. The finding also is consistent with [Equation (1)] if [Equation (1)] is approached
mathematically: Perfect contestability among modes means nothing but physically equal costs per
unit of production, which can, with respect to rail and truck, nerver be the case. From that point,
there can never be perfect contestability among rail and truck. Moreover, at least in a local
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pe r ton-mile over cost covering truck rate pe r ton-mile, in conjunction with
differences in the distance shipper-terminal, has an impact on rail rates, but
unless this ratio is equal to one, which is not realistic, railroads do have a cost
advantage over trucks allowing for excess profits.

4.

Particular Markets
a.

Intermodal Container Transportation between the Ohio River
Region and the North Atlantic Coast Region

In section B.2. of this chapter, intermodal container transportation
between the Ohio River region and the North Atlantic Coast region was identified
to be most likely to be contestable. In intermodal container transportation, the
high-cost carrier service can be provided either by the same ownership entity
that provides the long haul or by an independent firm. The first case constitutes
a natural monopoly (see section A.1. of this chapter) which is, compared to the
second alternative, less likely to be contestable. If independent firms provide the
short-haul, there is a potential for vigorous competition among high-cost carriers
for the haul over the distance shipper-transshipment facility. In section B.3. of
this chapter the foundations for contestability at the level of the shipper were
developed. For a transportation market to be perfectly contestable, the rate

setting, a railroad has always an advantage compared to trucking firms (see findings from
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differentials of railroad service and trucking service at the originating market and
at the destination markets have to be equal to zero, which is quite unlikely to be
the case in reality. Consequently, the market at issue is not perfectly
contestable.

On the other hand, in both the Ohio River region and in the North Atlantic
Coast region there are numerous independent trucking firms providing potential
competitive transportation services between hub facilities and customers. Thus,
it is likely that there is a competitive finite trucking rate rHthat leads to a
contestability degree greater than 0 and a monopoly degree of M = (1-C) less
than 1. Thus, the intermodal container transportation market between the Ohio
River region and the North Atlantic Coast region shows some contestable
characteristics but is not perfectly contestable. The bottom line of this market
structure is that railroads do have a positive advantage, trucking firms do have
an advantage equal to zero, and shippers have a negative advantage. The
availability of trucking service, which is competitive in its primary market and
which is a physical substitute for railroad service, constitutes an upper boundary
of the railroad’s advantage and a lower boundary on the shipper’s disadvantage.

[Equation (b)]).
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b.

Transportation o f Grain out o f North Dakota

Table X on page 123 shows that transportation of grain out of North
Dakota has been identified to be the least potentially contestable market in the
U.S. There has been evidence that railroad pricing in this market is
monopolistic.242

North Dakota represents a classic captive market. First, North Dakota is
served by only two railroads, Burlington Northern and the Soo Line. Second, the
degree of intermodal competition is limited. Due to the great distances to major
markets of consumption, processing, and export, such as the Pacific Northwest,
the East Coast, and the Gulf, trucking is not an economically feasible mode in
transporting grain out of North Dakota. North Dakota's nearest barge loading
facility for grain is Minneapolis/St. Paul in Minnesota, over 200 miles from the
nearest North Dakota city and operational only two-thirds of the year. Hence,
barge competition is virtually nonexistent. Third, the primary products produced
in North Dakota are relatively unique to the region so rail rates are not
constrained much by competition with product substitutes from different regions
moving at competitive rates.

242 See Koo, 1993. Includes further references. See also Schmitz, 1995.
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Between 1984 and 1989, over 73 percent of the grain shipments from
North Dakota moved by rail.243 In 1996, the rate for a grain car trip from
Bismarck, North Dakota to Minneapolis (400 miles) was $2,300. The rate for a
grain car trip from Minneapolis to Chicago (also 400 miles), however, was
$1,000. The only difference between these routes is that the route from
Bismarck to Minneapolis is a monopoly route while the route from Minneapolis to
Chicago is not.244 This gives clear evidence that railroads take advantage of
market power if there is an opportunity to do so.

Railroads defended themselves on charges of abuse by noting that the
number of complaints against rail rates has been decreasing over the years. In
the early 1990s, fewer than ten complaints and protests per year were filed with
the ICC compared with nearly 300 per year before 1980.245 A reason for this
decline might be that the ICC has been increasing fees for filing rate complaints.
In 1995, the cost of challenging a single rate under current ICC standards for
"market dominance" and "rate reasonableness" was about $250,000 - $500,000,
a prohibitive cost for a small country elevator.246 In 1996, the Surface

243 Koo, 1993.
244 Congressional Press Releases, 1997.
245 U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994.
246 Kocemba, 1995.

136

Transportation Board proposed to increase the fees for filing rate complaints by
23,000 percent, from $1,000 up to $233,000.247

c.

Transportation o f Coal - “Bottlenecks”

Transportation of solid bulk material out of the region W est of the Missouri
River has been identified to be the second least potentially contestable market in
the U.S. (Table X on page 123). Presently, railroads are accused of abusing
market power in the coal business. A "bottleneck case” is constituted if two or
more railroads serve the origin point of coal but only one railroad serves the
destination (usually an electric utility plant). Generally, the competing railroads
are asking the Surface Transportation Board to require the “bottleneck carrier” to
offer only a local service, short-haul rate from the closest interchange point to the
final destination which would enable them to compete on the long-haul and
interchange cars at the interchange point. Utilities also attempt to challenge the
reasonableness of the rate over the bottleneck part. In the most recent
“bottleneck case” which involved Union Pacific, Conrail, the STB ruled against
the utility, deciding that both the law and precedent made it clear that a shipper
cannot insist that a “bottleneck railroad” provides only a short-haul service under

247 Schulz, 04/15/96.
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a local rate that could be separately challenged if the carrier also provides originto-destination service by itself or in conjunction with another railroad.248

C.

Is Open-Access a Working Alternative?
Due to cases of abuse of market power on the part of railroads, injured

parties - mostly farmers, mining firms, and public utilities - have been rising
claims for greater government participation in the railroad industry.249 In
particular, proponents o f re-regulation promote requiring railroads to open their
track to competitors for some form of access fee proportional to use. More
radical minded proponents of re-regulation even suggest government ownership
of track or ownership of the track by a person prohibited from acting as a carrier.

The argument is that open-access would break up monopoly routes since
any railroad would have access to any track. In a structural sense, open-access
means transition from a monopoly to a more competitive stage by stimulating
entry. Competition among railroads would decrease the probability of earning a
rent. It also would at least reduce prevalent rate discrimination against product
and geographic markets (see section B.4. of this chapter on page 132) and

248 Welty, 1997.
249 Edwards, 10/13/96, and Burke, 09/23/96.
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hence eliminate some major opportunities for cross-subsidizing. In the past,
competition among railroads lead to destructive competition.250 The ultimate
cause of destructive competition are high fixed costs of infrastructure (which are
also sunk costs) that need to be allocated among output. Under open-access
regulation which would leave ownership of track with the railroads, railroads
would recover at least a share of fixed costs via access fees. Further, since
each railroad were likely to take up some track of other railroads for which fees
had to be paid, these (former fixed costs) were then changed into variable cost.
Thus open-access, even with ownership of track left with the railroads, would
reallocate fixed costs as variable costs and hence would take away the base of
destructive competition. Government ownership of track would fully reallocate
fixed costs of infrastructure as variable costs as long as fees payable were tight
to actual demands. In effect, government ownership of railroad infrastructure
would move the railroad industry closer to conditions under which the trucking
industry is operating. The trucking industry does not own road infrastructure,
however, it finances the major share (but less than its engineering share) of the
interstate highway system via taxes.251

Opposition to open-access comes from the railroads. Railroads claim
open-access would discourage investment in new equipment and facilities and

250 See Footnote 21 on page 20.
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that it would hurt customer service in the long run.252 Admittedly, the prospect of
exclusive usage of investments and of a future monopoly rent may be a stronger
incentive for investing in assets than the prospect of earning a normal profit.
Moreover, commonly used infrastructure may be an incentive to shirk which
would lead to deterioration. It can also be argued that only a “rent” may provide
funds for future investments. On the other hand, the prospect of being a
monopolist may even not require any improvements at all because shippers will
have no choice anyway. This argument for open-access is quite credible when
contemplating the different market segments of railroads and trucking services
by ranking them by their degree of competition: The North Dakota grain
transportation market would be located on the monopolistic edge, followed by
transportation of coal and so on. The most competitive edge would be the truck
load (TL) trucking market, followed by the less-than- truck-load (LTL) trucking
service and then followed by intermodal service involving railroads. The
observation is that the more competitive the market is, the better is the customer
service perceived by shippers.253 Therefore, open-access is most likely to
improve railroad service rather than to harm service. The argument that openaccess will not work technically has been disproved by the fact that Amtrak has
been operating for more than 25 years almost exclusively under trackage rights
agreements.

251 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993, p. 12.
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In sum, open-access appears to be a working alternative to improve
railroad service through enlivening intramodal competition without bearing the
drawbacks formerly experienced in connection with railroad competition.
However, since there are basically only five competing firms in the industry, the
industry will remain an oligopoly which facilitates collusion and cartelization.
That is, although open-access would formally establish competition, railroads
could tacitly enter into mutual agreements not to serve certain markets so that
each railroad would remain a monopolist in a particular market. A similar
development has occurred in the deregulated airline industry where each major
carrier dominates several different hub airports.254

252 Edwards, 10/13/96, and Burke, 09/23/96.
253 See Kocemba, 1995 and United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1993.
254 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 50.
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CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSIONS
Deregulation has achieved its primary goal. The financial condition of
railroads has bettered remarkably. Railroads were able to increase their rate of
return to levels that had never been reached since the late 1920s.255 Increases in
profitability have been accompanied by dramatic increases in productivity.

In addition, firm concentration of Class I railroads has reached dimensions
far beyond anti-competitive levels. Only five major railroads remain in the U.S.
All major railroads have acquired different modes of transportation and have
entered the emerging market for intermodal transportation. Taking the
characteristics of natural monopolies into account, the trend towards intramodal
and intermodal concentration is consistent with monopoly price discrimination
tactics. However, concentration was assumed to not be harmful to competition
because of the presence of intermodal competition (contestability).

The findings of this study suggest that in general deregulation of railroads
on the basis of contestable markets is not justified. By definition, the
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(intramodal) railroad transportation market can never be contestable as long as
railroads own infrastructure because infrastructure constitutes major sunk costs.
Sunk costs are not allowed in a contestable market.256 Open-access to trackage
would eliminate sunk costs, the main barrier to entry. The intramodal railroad
market would be contestable if all significant barriers to entry were abolished and
if market entry would occur upon any one firm earning an excess profit.
However, even if all barriers to entry were abolished, entry at the local level,
where competition actually occurs, would not happen. Thus, railroad profitability
and extensive entry are mutually exclusive.257 With respect to the entire market,
railroads have an incentive to intentionally refrain from entry into particular
markets in order to mutually maintain profits. Thus, entry is unlikely to occur
even in the absence of barriers to entry.258 Cases of exertion of monopoly po w e r.
in the markets for transportation of grain and coal provide evidence that the
intramodal railroad transportation market is monopolistic if unregulated.

In intermodal transportation the degree of contestability depends on
whether or not railroads own other modes of transportation. If railroads own
other modes of transportation, the entire chain of intermodal transportation is a

255 Previous years have not been taken into account because of differences in accounting
methods.
256 See The Contestable Market Theory on page 22.
257 See The Local Market on page 125.
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natural monopoly which is not contestable. If railroads do not own other modes
of transportation, then the intermodal transportation market on ly can be
considered to be contestable to the extent to which railroad service is technically
and economically substitutable and to the extent suitable substitutes are
available. It has been shown that railroad service is never fully economically
substitutable by other modes. Therefore, intermodal transportation never can be
fully contestable. To conclude, there is no railroad market segment that is truly
contestable and the predictions of the contestable market theory do not hold in
practice respectively.

In addition to the railroad industry’s recent deregulation, the airline
industry also has been deregulated recently. In 1978, it was argued the airline
industry would be highly contestable after deregulation. In 1996, Blechschmidt
found that the airline industry did n o t exhibit the characteristics of a contestable
market after deregulation. Particularly, there are distinct barriers to entry erected
by incumbents at hub cities that bar entry into the industry and preserve local
monopolies.259

258 It can be distinguished between entry by existing railroads and entry by new railroads. Entry by
existing railroads is easier than entry by new railroads. Thus, no entry by existing railroads means
no entry by new railroads.
259 Blechschmidt, 1996, p. 73.
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The political settings of the 1970s and 1980s give a credible explanation
why the contestable market theory does not hold in practice.260 When the Bell
System came under antitrust challenge in 1974, AT&T employed economists,
who later became known as the Baumol group, at least partly to formulate ideas
to resist the antitrust suit and later to resist entry into its markets. The
contestability idea has been taken up by other witnesses representing dominant
firms other than AT&T. Thus the purpose of the contestable market theory was
to provide an argument in favor of dominant firms rather than to explain real
market structures.

If the present merger policy is not changed, then concentration in the
railroad industry will continue, and the United States will be left with only one or
two major railroads in the near future. Those railroads will be operating at large
scale (both in intra- and intermodal transportation) and hence at low average
total cost, which is a potential benefit for the society. On the other hand, since
then all competition will have been taken away, those railroads will have the
ability to fully exploit their monopoly power. Given the non-contestability of the
railroad monopoly as well as past experience, the latter is likely to happen.
Thus, only a political shift towards more rigid merger guidelines can protect
society from being at the mercy of the railroads.

260 Shepherd, 1995.
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